Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the Administrative State by Weiser, Philip J.
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
2009 
Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the 
Administrative State 
Philip J. Weiser 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Communications Law Commons 
Citation Information 
Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the Administrative State, 61 
ADMIN. L. REV. 675 (2009), available at https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/453. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
Citation: 61 Admin. L. Rev. 675 2009 
Provided by: 
William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Thu Mar  2 17:53:43 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
ARTICLES
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, FCC REFORM,




I. B ackground ..................................................................................... 679
A. The FCC in Historical Perspective .......................................... 680
B. The Political Culture of the FCC ............................................. 684
C. The Possibility of Regulatory Reform ..................................... 690
II. Toward a New Institutional Strategy .............................................. 692
A . Strategic A genda Setting ......................................................... 694
B. A Commitment to Transparency ............................................. 698
III. Toward Principled and Collegial Decisionmaking ......................... 702
A. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking .......................................... 702
B. Adjudications, Enforcement, and the Use of ALJs .................. 704
C . M erger R eview s ....................................................................... 708
IV. Toward Data-Driven Decisionmaking ............................................ 711
A. A Commitment to Independent Research ................................ 711
B. An Effective Partnership with Other Governmental,
Academic, and Industry Resources ......................................... 715
C. Collecting and Sharing Data with the Public ........................... 716
V. Toward a New Project for Administrative Law .............................. 719
C onclu sion ................................................................................................. 72 1
* Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
and Professor of Law and Telecommunications, University of Colorado at Boulder (on
leave). This Article, written before joining the federal government, represents the author's
views and should not be attributed to the Justice Department or the federal government.
Thanks to the Ford Foundation for a grant to support this research and to Dan McCormick
for first-rate research assistance as well as to Mark Cooper, Nestor Davidson, Pierre de
Vries, Kyle Dixon, Ray Gifford, Dale Hatfield, Clare Huntington, Bill Kennard, Mike
Marcus, Jonathan Nuechterlein, Adam Peters, Jonathan Sallet, Cathy Sharkey, Jim Speta,
and Joe Waz for valuable comments and encouragement.
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W REVIEW
We are in danger of becoming prisoners of our own procedures in the
administrative process.
-Newton N. Minow, FCC Chairman, 1961-63l
Administrative law has yet to grapple with its most fundamental
challenge. Today, administrative agencies are more significant than
common law courts, leading Cass Sunstein to conclude that "[a]s a matter
of simple practice, administrative agencies have become America's
common law courts.",2  Consequently, legal scholars have focused
considerable attention on the substantive rules generated by administrative
areas, ranging from environmental law to health and safety regulation to
telecommunications policy. At the same time, traditional administrative
law scholars have generally focused on the rules governing federal court
review of agency decisionmaking. What remains off the agenda, however,
is the equally, and perhaps more, important question of how administrative
agencies actually develop the rules that are evaluated on appeal.
In studying the modem administrative state, legal scholars have failed to
examine the questions related to institutional competence and structure that
determine whether administrative regulation can be effective. 3 At the dawn
of the administrative state, this type of inquiry was taken seriously by
scholars.4 Of late, however, it has fallen out of fashion. To make the case
for evaluating how administrative agencies actually operate, this Article
evaluates the institutional failings of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC or Commission), arguing that these failings are even
1. Newton N. Minow, Suggestions for Improvement of the Administrative Process, 15
ADMIN. L. REv. 146, 153 (1963).
2. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law
Courts, 47 DuKE L.J. 1013, 1068 (1998). For a discussion of the turn from courts to
agencies as the primary driver of legal policy decisions, see Philip J. Weiser, Federal
Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1692, 1716-26 (2001).
3. Unfortunately, the complaint of law professor and former Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) Commissioner Nick Johnson lodged over a quarter century ago still
holds: "Rather than seeking methods for improving the administrative process to avoid
unsound, unfair, and arbitrary decisions, scholars have focused almost exclusively on the
role of the courts in supervising and reviewing agency action." Nicholas Johnson, The
Second Half of Jurisprudence: The Study of Administrative Decisionmaking, 23 STAN. L.
REv. 173, 174 (1970) (reviewing KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969)).
4. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Institutional Administrative Decisions, 48 COLUM.
L. REV. 173 (1948) (examining the strengths and weaknesses of agency adjudication
processes); A.H. Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Administrative Law, 47
YALE L.J. 647 (1938) (arguing that, between mere hostility to, defense of, and general
misunderstanding of the administrative system, scholars must make serious attempts to
understand the justifications for the administrative state).
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more significant than the substantive policy issues superintended by that
agency. In so doing, this Article explains how institutional processes can
often dictate or distort substantive outcomes.
The institutional failings of the FCC have long escaped careful review in
both scholarly and popular discussions about the agency. For years, the
agency has maintained a level of mystery and secrecy over both what
issues it chooses to consider and how it considers them. In particular, the
agency has relied on the ex parte process at the expense of the formal
notice-and-comment procedure. Moreover, it has utilized a limited degree
of collegial discussion between the commissioners and the public in
making its decisions. The result of such broken procedures is that the FCC
operates in a dysfunctional fashion and fails to grapple effectively with the
critical issues it is charged with addressing.
After years of neglecting the FCC's institutional flaws, Congress has
finally taken an interest in the question of whether and how to reform the
FCC's institutional processes. To that end, both House Commerce
Committee Chair Emeritus John Dingell and Senate Commerce Committee
Chair Jay Rockefeller have expressed serious concerns about how the
agency operates, 5 and the House Commerce Committee majority released a
report citing serious failings in the operations of the agency.6 As for public
commentaries, law professor Lawrence Lessig has responded to the
criticisms of the agency by calling for its abolition.7
In response to the congressional interest in institutional reform at the
FCC, former Chairman Kevin Martin disclaimed the need for any
legislative action, adjusted some of the FCC's operating procedures, and
defended the agency on the grounds that his tactics were similar to those of
5. Letter from John D. Dingell, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
to Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n (Dec. 3, 2007),
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_ 10/110-1tr. 120307.FCC.Martin.transparency.pdf
("Given several events and proceedings over the past year, I am rapidly losing confidence
that the Commission has been conducting its affairs in an appropriate manner."); Ted Heam,
Watching the Martin Watch, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 21, 2008,
http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6524092.html (calling on the Senate to evaluate the
"'structure of the agency, its mission, the terms of the commissioners, and how to make the
agency a better regulator, advocate for consumers, and a better resource for Congress."'
(quoting Sen. Rockefeller)).
6. See MAJORITY STAFF, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, I 10TH CONG.,
DECEPTION AND DISTRUST: THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION UNDER CHAIRMAN
KEVIN J. MARTIN (2008),
http://energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/PDF/Newsroom/fc%20major
ity%20staff/o20report%20081209.pdf [hereinafter DECEPTION AND DISTRUST] (finding that
the FCC suffers from significant transparency and management issues).
7. Lawrence Lessig, Reboot the FCC, NEWSWEEK.COM, Dec. 23, 2008,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/ 176809.
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his predecessors. 8 Whether Martin's management style is different from
past agency chairs, the great weight of opinion is that the FCC has always
operated in a suboptimal fashion and is in dire need of institutional reform.
As former FCC Commissioner Glen Robinson noted over forty years ago,
"Few agencies of Government have been so doggedly pursued by critics as
the FCC." 9 Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt added his own damning
observation: that the agency suffers from a perennial "reputation for agency
capture by special interests, mind-boggling delay, internal strife, lack of
competence, and a dreadful record on judicial review."'  In short, the
question is not whether to reform the agency's operations, but how to do
so.
Even with an awareness of the importance of institutional processes,
there is a powerful pull at policymakers and scholars to focus solely on the
substantive issues on an agency's agenda: spectrum policy reform, network
neutrality, and universal service policy in the case of the FCC. This
approach, however, overlooks the fundamentally important point that
institutional processes shape the ability of an agency to be an effective
regulator for the public interest." In the case of the FCC, its current lack of
data-driven decisionmaking and emphasis on political dealing hinders the
thoughtfulness of its analysis, limits its ability to address issues effectively,
and invites a cynical attitude toward government.'
2
8. John Eggerton, Martin: FCC Doesn 't Need Major Reform, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Jan. 15, 2008, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6522942.html (quoting
Martin as stating that "[i]n general, our processes aren't any different than they were under
previous chairmen both Republican and Democrat."). Some longtime agency observers
essentially second Martin's judgment, noting that "[t]he FCC needs to reform and it has
needed to for 25 years .... Too much is done behind closed doors secretly and it has been
that way through Democratic and Republican leadership." Cecilia Kang, FCC Chairman
Abused Power, House Probe Finds, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2008, at DI (quoting Consumer
Union's Gene Kimmelman).
9. Glen 0. Robinson, Radio Spectrum Regulation: The Administrative Process and
the Problems of Institutional Reform, 53 MINN. L. REv. 1179, 1239 (1969).
10. Reed E. Hundt & Gregory L. Rosston, Communications Policy for 2006 and
Beyond, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 31 (2006).
11. In explaining his commitment to a serious evaluation of the Federal Trade
Commission's (FTC's) institutional processes (as part of an "FTC at 100" study), Chairman
Bill Kovacic explained,
The quality of institutional design, institutional infrastructure, and institutional
process has a great deal to do with determining the quality of substantive outcomes.
The same energy that's dedicated to asking what's the right doctrine or what's the
right conceptual framework has to be applied to questions concerning optimal
institutional design and operational arrangements.
Interview with William E. Kovacic, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, ANTITRUST
SOURCE, Aug. 2008, at 8, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/08/08/AugO8-
Kovaciclntrvw8=6f.pdf.
12. See Jim Puzzanghera, Criticism of the FCC's Chairman Is Widely Aired, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at CI ("Critics have complained that important issues-such as the
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This Article proceeds in six parts. Part I briefly describes the long-
standing criticisms of how the FCC operates, highlighting a few recent
episodes that have drawn attention to the need for institutional reform. Part
II discusses the opportunity for the FCC to adopt a new institutional
strategy for telecommunications policymaking, emphasizing the
importance of strategic agenda setting and transparency. Part III explains
how the agency can use its policymaking tools-rulemaking, adjudication,
and merger review-more effectively. Part IV underscores the opportunity
for the agency to upgrade its collection and dissemination of data as well as
its involvement of the public in its decisionmaking processes. Part V
highlights, using the analysis of the FCC as a case study, the need for
administrative law scholars to evaluate the importance of institutional
structure, competence, and process. Finally, this Article offers a short
conclusion.
I. BACKGROUND
The FCC is a good case study for how a regulatory commission operates
because it oversees an important and large segment of the economy and its
operations are deeply flawed, with many claiming that its acronym stands
for "from crisis to crisis." 13 In theory, an administrative agency like the
FCC should be able to evaluate alternative regulatory strategies and take a
holistic perspective to its policymaking mission. In practice, however, the
agency is constrained by its tendency to view issues in isolation without
any strategic direction or focus. In some respects, the Commission has
adopted the most limiting aspects of the judicial process-reacting mostly
2009 transition to digital television and reforming a fund that subsidizes phone and Internet
service for low-income and rural residents-are taking a back seat to bickering."). The
often cavalier attitude toward regulation was described and bemoaned by Judge Posner as
follows:
There has I think been a tendency of recent Administrations, both Republican and
Democratic but especially the former, not to take regulation very seriously. This
tendency expresses itself in deep cuts in staff and in the appointment of regulatory
administrators who are either political hacks or are ideologically opposed to
regulation. (I have long thought it troublesome that Alan Greenspan was a follower
of Ayn Rand.) This would be fine if zero regulation were the social desideratum, but
it is not. The correct approach is to carve down regulation to the optimal level but
then finance and staff and enforce the remaining regulatory duties competently and in
good faith. Judging by the number of scandals in recent years involving the regulation
of health, safety, and the environment, this is not being done.
Posting of Richard Posner to Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/archives/2008/04/reregulate fina.html (Apr. 28, 2008, 12:35 EST).
13. See, e.g., James H. Quello, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at the
John Bayless Broadcast Foundation Annual Banquet (Oct. 30, 1996),
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Quello/spjhq608.txt (remarking that the institutional structure
of the FCC is often slow to confront emerging challenges).
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to matters that come before it-as well as the less elevated aspects of the
legislative process: engaging in political dealmaking and rewarding those
with influence. The challenge for the agency-and for scholars analyzing
it-is to evaluate how to combine the best of both traditions, i.e., drawing
on the Judiciary's legacy of impartiality and data-driven decisionmaking
and the Legislative Branch's ability to view issues in a broad and strategic
manner. This Part thus first provides some background on how the agency
operates, then discusses its political culture, and concludes by highlighting
some avenues for institutional reform.
A. The FCC in Historical Perspective
The FCC has long used suboptimal procedures and processes. These
failings are not, however, due merely to shortcomings in leadership. As an
initial matter, the agency's "public interest" standard is notoriously
flexible, open-ended, and susceptible to legislative-like decisionmaking.
14
Moreover, the agency's operations and institutional habits were shaped by
its early statutory assignments. One critical role the FCC traditionally
played was making the inherently political judgments of who had the right
to use particular radio frequencies. As a historical matter, the agency took
as its mandate the need to evaluate which particular firms or individuals
were best suited to hold licenses to use the radio spectrum, using
comparative hearings to select the best applicant. In some cases, this
process was famously used to benefit those with political connections-
including then-Congressman Lyndon Johnson's wife15-and, in other
cases, it led the agency to make judgments about the relative importance to
the U.S. economy of different activities (such as livestock breeding as
opposed to dairy inspection). 16 In all cases, the agency was limited in its
ability to use judicial-like processes because, as noted economist Alfred
Kahn put it, "The dispensation of favors to a selected few is a political act,
not a judicial one."'
17
14. As such, some have questioned the constitutionality of the FCC's statutory
mandate. See Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard Is It Too Indeterminate to Be
Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMm. L.J. 427, 429-30 (2001) (noting the FCC's broad use of the
public interest standard and arguing that the standard is inconsistent with constitutional
separation of powers principles).
15. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MEANS OF ASCENT 82-95
(1990).
16. See Petition of Lehigh Coop. Farmers, Inc., 10 F.C.C.2d 315 (1967) (selecting best
applicant for a radio license based indirectly on value of relevant occupations).
17. THOMAS K. MCCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 286 (1984). For many years, the
FCC attempted to justify its use of comparative hearings as to who received a broadcast
license as a principled enterprise. Ultimately, however, former FCC Chairman Newton
Minow captured the prevailing conclusion in stating that "it is largely true that the
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A second critical and formative role of the FCC was to regulate natural
monopolies. This project often entailed an implicit partnership between the
regulated parties and the regulator. As former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt
put it, the old tradition embraced monopolies "as the best market structures
to deliver universal and high quality communications services, such as
telephony or video."' 8 In the assessment of Judge Posner, this model of
regulation involved a cozy relationship between the two parties, but not
necessarily because the regulator was captured by or subject to political
forces. Rather, as Posner saw it, the agency's regulatory regime allowed
(or even encouraged) the interests of the regulator to become intertwined
with the conduct of the regulated firm that participated in an agency
program-such as the protection of universal service-through a process
that he called "taxation by regulation."'1 9
The FCC's legacy of command-and-control regulation and political
favoritism has often steered the agency toward ad hoc judgments and away
from any principled framework for evaluating alternative courses of action.
Almost forty years ago, FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson summed up
this legacy in bemoaning that "[t]oo often decisions are the product of an
ad hoc disposition reigning in the absence of any clearly articulated
standards for spectrum allocation and utilization priorities., 20 In reviewing
the spectrum management decisions by the Commission of the 1960s,
Johnson offered criticisms that could be made of today's Commission,
highlighting "the need to view spectrum problems as a whole; the need to
anticipate and plan for future spectrum requirements; and the need to obtain
better and more complete data on the use of the spectrum.",2' Moreover, in
another criticism that holds equally true today, Johnson noted that the FCC
generally fails to utilize any of its own insights or independent research,
Commission has failed to develop any coherent policy in the comparative field. Almost
every student of the Commission has reached this conclusion .... Minow, supra note 1, at
148.
18. Reed Hundt, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Speech at the Center for
National Policy (May 6, 1996), http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh624.txt.
19. Richard A. Posner, Taxation By Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. ScI. 22
(1971); see also Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Scl. 335 (1974) (analyzing and critiquing the "public interest" theory of government
regulation).
20. Nicholas Johnson, Towers of Babel: The Chaos in Radio Spectrum Utilization and
Allocation, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 505, 512 (1969).
21. Id. at 528. For my own suggestions on spectrum policy reform, see Philip J.
Weiser, The Untapped Promise of Wireless Spectrum (Hamilton Project, Brookings Inst.,
Discussion Paper No. 2008-08, 2008),
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/07-wireless-weiser/07-wireless-w
eiser.pdf (arguing that the FCC should measure how spectrum is used, identify blocks of
unused spectrum, and encourage flexibility in leasing and licensing to utilize unused
spectrum).
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relying "almost exclusively upon information and analysis supplied by [the
parties that appear before it]."
22
The FCC's tendency to engage in ad hoc decisionmaking-which goes
hand in hand with a lack of any serious effort at strategic planning-has
perennially attracted criticism. In 1949, former President Herbeit
Hoover-who as Commerce Secretary was largely responsible for the
establishment of the Federal Radio Commission, which evolved into the
FCC-led a commission that concluded that the FCC had "failed both to
define its primary objectives and to make many policy determinations
required for efficient and expeditious administration. 23 In a similar vein,
Professor Landis, who helped President Roosevelt develop the basic
architecture of the modern administrative state, authored a report for
President Kennedy that excoriated the FCC for being "incapable of policy
planning, of disposing within a reasonable period of time the business
before it, [and] of fashioning procedures that are effective to deal with its
problems., 24  Despite such criticisms, the FCC's practice of ad hoc
decisionmaking has remained largely intact.
To appreciate the costs of a lack of strategic planning, consider the
landmark proceeding that authorized domestic satellites. This proceeding,
while seemingly obscure to many of today's observers, led to a
revolutionary form of communications that transformed an array of
communications technologies, from video programming to cell phones to
international voice communications. As Commissioner Johnson explained,
this proceeding did not emerge from a strategic assessment of technological
possibilities and how the Commission could advance their development,
but rather from a proposal shaped by ABC. 5 Consequently, the FCC
began its analysis of that matter by debating whether to grant the request
without first carefully evaluating the appropriate regulatory strategy.
Fortunately, as Johnson described it, "The Ford Foundation subsequently
filed a proposal that radically changed the frame of reference in which the
question was being discussed-including the concept of a 'people's
dividend"' from the substantial investment that followed the FCC's
decision.26 That concept, in short, led to proposals for funding the Public
Broadcasting Service that, but for the Ford Foundation's intervention, the
22. Johnson, supra note 20, at 530.
23. COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, TASK FORCE REPORT
ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 95 (1949).
24. JAMES LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 53
(1960).
25. See Johnson, supra note 20, at 530 (describing the formulation of proceedings
authorizing domestic satellite use).
26. Id.
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Commission would have overlooked.
For another case illustrating the costs of the FCC's lack of strategic
planning and its inability to act proactively, consider the decision to
authorize cellular telephone service. The proposal stemmed from a request
by AT&T, which sought the sole authority to deploy such a service.
Significantly, AT&T's incentive to roll out the service was dulled by its
status as a dominant firm evaluating a potentially disruptive technology,
i.e., it was skeptical that the technology could succeed, it did not believe
there would be a huge market for it, and it worried that wireless services
might ultimately pose a threat to its landline operations.2 7 Consequently,
neither the FCC nor AT&T pushed the matter aggressively, leading to a
"slow rolled" authorization, which cost American consumers, by one
account, $33 billion in lost productivity gains.28
Flowing in part from the agency's tendency to approach issues in a
reactive and ad hoc manner, the FCC also often fails to address issues in an
intellectually defensible and careful manner. One notable and famous such
case arose from the agency's reevaluation of the financial interest and
syndication (finsyn) rules, which restricted the ability of broadcast
networks to produce TV programming. 29 Originally, these rules were seen
as providing important protections for independent TV producers, but over
time the rules increasingly appeared to protect the Hollywood studios
(which fought for the preservation of the rules) from competition by the
networks that were eager to create their own programming development
arms. The FCC wrote a long opinion deciding to keep the rules in place
that Judge Posner, in overturning it on appeal, famously remarked was
"like a Persian cat with its fur shaved ... alarmingly pale and thin."30 To
that zinger, he added that "[t]he impression created [by the agency's
opinion] is of unprincipled compromises of Rube Goldberg complexity
among contending interest groups viewed merely as clamoring supplicants
who have somehow to be conciliated."
3'
In evaluating the above proceedings and the Commission's legacy, some
former FCC officials have concluded that the agency is prone to capture by
the interests it regulates. Former Chair Reed Hundt, for example,
27. The dulled incentives of AT&T in this case are consistent with the dynamics
described in CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997).
28. Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in
Telecommunications, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1,
23 (Martin Neil Baily et al. eds., 1997).
29. See Schurz Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that
new finsyn rules were arbitrary and capricious).
30. Id. at 1050.
31. Id.
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suggested that the acronym "FCC" stands for "Firmly Captured by
Corporations," 32 while former FCC Chief Economist Tom Hazlett counters
that "FCC" stands for "Forever Captured by Corporations. '33 Contrary to
these suggestions, the FCC's challenge is not so much the classic portrait of
agency capture (e.g., the revolving door) or even the more subtle version of
the intertwined interests model (i.e., taxation by regulation) advanced by
Posner. Rather, it is the agency's institutional limitations-a failure to
approach issues strategically, to develop independent solutions, and to
anticipate issues ahead of particular crises-that often lead it to miss
opportunities to chart independent courses of action like the one identified
by the Ford Foundation as to satellite policy. To highlight this issue, the
next section discusses three recent case studies in which the agency
operated in a highly questionable fashion.
B. The Political Culture of the FCC
The conduct of administrative regulation at the FCC over the last several
years has underscored the political culture described above as well as the
institutional failings long cited by critics of the agency. In just the second
half of 2007, the processes used in three high profile and important
proceedings-the open access rules imposed as part of the 700 Megahertz
(MHz) auction, the proposed regulations on cable providers based on a
finding of adoption of cable services by 70% of consumers, and the media
ownership rules-all illustrate the problematic nature of how the FCC often
operates. The portrait of agency dysfunction raised by these three
proceedings makes plain the nature of the agency's institutional failings,
highlights how it can ultimately undermine the success of policymaking
initiatives, and provides a compelling case for institutional reform.
In the summer of 2007, the FCC debated and developed rules for
imposing an open access obligation on a wireless provider as part of the
auction of valuable "beachfront" wireless spectrum in the 700 MHz band.34
In stimulating this discussion, however, the FCC failed to suggest publicly
that it had any particular proposal in mind, only stating in its Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) the general possibility that it might take
32. Hundt, supra note 18.
33. Drew Clark, Industry Experts Disagree on Best Path to Improve FCC,
TECHNOLOGY DAILY, Mar. 24, 2005,
http://www.nationaljoumal.com/pubs/techdaily/pmedition/2005/tp050324.htm.
34. Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, 22 F.C.C.R.
8064 (2007) (report and order and further notice of proposed rulemaking) (explaining the
need to revise access rules to expand 700 MHz spectrum availability and establishing new
licensing regulations).
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some action along these lines.35 Subsequent to the issuance of the NPRM,
as Cynthia Brumfield described the process, "Chairman Kevin Martin
floated an unofficial proposal (via USA Today no less),36 everybody
scrambled, a circus ensued and a compromise, a clearly political
compromise, was ultimately made., 37 Consequently, the debate over the
proposal was hurried and conducted via vague and hard-to-follow ex parte
filings after the official notice-and-comment period had ended, resulting in
a decision that left open a number of issues for later resolution.38
The rushed nature of the FCC's deliberation and decisionmaking process
gave rise to a subsequent shadow debate over the scope of the rules after
they were formally adopted. In the wake of the agency's decision, some
parties apparently saw an opportunity for continued lobbying after the
matter had purportedly been decided.39  Using the Google Public Policy
Blog as a means of shedding sunlight on this effort to raise the issue anew,
Google Telecom Counsel Rick Whitt highlighted this very unorthodox
tactic and noted with dismay that "it seems that a 'final' vote by a federal
government agency is merely the beginning of a new phase in the
process. 4° Ultimately, the FCC declined to change its rules in response to
this effort.41
The second proceeding that merits examination is the effort to impose a
wide-ranging set of prescriptive regulations on cable companies based on
highly questionable information. Under the 1992 Cable Act, the FCC is
authorized to develop more-restrictive regulations of cable television
35. Id. at 8086 (noting the debate concerning adopting additional rules to promote
secondary market transactions).
36. Leslie Cauley, New Rules Could Rock Wireless World, USAToDAY.COM, July 10,
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/telecom/2007-07-09-wireless-
telecom n.htm.
37. IP Democracy, http://www.ipdemocracy.com/archives/2007/09/13/#002651 (Sept.
13, 2007, 23:15 EST); see also IP Democracy,
http://www.ipdemocracy.com/archives/2007/09/05/#002640 (Sept. 5, 2007, 09:17 EST)
("Martin never made his proposal public and everybody was working off of press reports
and rumors.").
38. Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, 22 F.C.C.R.
15,289 (2007) (second report and order) (addressing several issues left untouched by the
initial Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
39. See Posting of Richard Whitt to Google Public Policy Blog,
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2007/l 0/pro-consumer-spectrum-auction-rules-
at.html (Oct. 3, 2007, 14:29 EST) (noting that in the wake of the revised 700 MHz auction
rules, Verizon Wireless lobbied the FCC to restrict consumer choice provisions of the rules).
40. Id.
41. According to one account, this decision was not for lack of trying by Chairman
Martin. See Jeffrey Silva, Martin Working to Revise 700 MHz Open-Access Provisions,
RCRWIRELESS, Sept. 26, 2007,
http://www.rcrwireless.com/article/20070926/SUB/70926006/Martin-working-to-revise-
700-MHz-open-access-provisions.
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providers if they serve 70% of the country and have 70% of subscribers in
that territory with thirty-six or more activated channels available to them.42
The first figure was attained many years ago, but the FCC has never
suggested that cable providers had reached the second one, generally
suggesting that cable penetration reaches a lower level than 70% (with
satellite TV and over-the-air TV serving the rest).43 In compiling its
regular report evaluating the multichannel video programming distribution
(MVPD) marketplace, the FCC regularly asked about the reach of cable
television providers, but this report was widely viewed as a fact-gathering
effort and not as a prelude to adopting regulations.
In the fall of 2007, Chairman Martin proposed that the FCC conclude
that the so-called 70-70 threshold had been met. To justify this finding, he
suggested that the agency rely on a single source (from a company that
later repudiated its own figure) and sought to suppress other relevant
information.44 In so doing, the agency did not use an adjudicative
process--or even the formal notice-and-comment process-to generate a
factual basis for its actions or to examine the issue. Moreover, in proposing
to embark on a new course, Chairman Martin did not even alert his fellow
commissioners-let alone the public--of the specifics of the proposed rule
changes or the questions related to the data that underlie them. In fact, as
the House Commerce Committee majority report examining the FCC's
processes found, "All of the other data collected in response to the Notice
of Inquiry was initially withheld from the other Commissioners, and the
career staff was directed not to discuss it with them., 45 To some observers,
this tactic merely reflected Chairman Martin's operating style of keeping
"his plans tightly wrapped, believing there's a tactical advantage in
springing them on other commissioners with little notice. 46
In the case of the proposed regulations for cable providers, the agency
ultimately refused to act in a secretive and hurried manner. Notably, in
evaluating the relevant information, Commissioner Adelstein (who
apparently was the swing vote) reported on the day he voted against the
proposed order that
I did not learn until after 7:00 pm last night that the FCC's own 2006 survey
42. 47 U.S.C. § 532(g) (2000).
43. Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Adopts 13th Annual Report to
Congress on Video Competition and Notice of Inquiry for the 14th Annual Report (Nov. 27,
2007), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-278454A 1 .pdf.
44. See Hearn, supra note 5 ("Not only did [Chairman Martin] rely on one and only
one data source-which turned out to be unreliable-but he was also nabbed suppressing
FCC-generated data that flatly contradicted his assertions about the level of cable
penetration.").
45. DECEPTION AND DISTRUST, supra note 6, at 13.
46. Jim Puzzanghera, s,!pra note 12.
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found that only 54 percent of homes passed subscribe to cable. Similarly, the
FCC's cable price survey came in at 55.2 percent penetration.
Based on these newly unearthed facts and the conflicting evidence on
the record, I am unable to support a finding that 70 percent of homes passed
subscribe to cable at this time. The data is inconclusive. If we were truly
searching for the truth it is inconceivable that our own data would be cast
aside without mention.
Moreover, Commissioner Adelstein noted that the process used in that
case-a failure to give sufficient notice to the other commissioners-did
not reflect any imperative for immediate action but was merely a tactical
effort to limit the opportunity for discussion and deliberation.48
A third proceeding that merits notice is the Commission's 2007
evaluation of the media ownership rules. In that case, Chairman Martin
detailed his proposal in a New York Times op-ed (rather than in a Further
Notice) only a little over a month before he asked his fellow commissioners
to vote on the proposal.49 Notably, this release "was not only the first time
the public [heard of the particular proposal but it] was also the first time the
Commissioners were notified of the details. 5 ° In defense of this tactic,
47. Statement of Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Re:
Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery of Video
Programming, MB Docket No. 06-189, Thirteenth Annual Report (Nov. 27, 2007), at 1
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-278454A4.pdf.
48. As Commissioner Adelstein put it,
One of the reasons for the embarrassing delay of today's meeting, and the
general disarray in working through these issues, was the effort to push through such
an aggressive number of controversial items today without sufficient notice to all
Commissioners. Short-circuiting Commission procedures short-changes the
American public in the end. This is particularly true given that nothing we are
considering today requires immediate action. There are numerous items that would
have benefited greatly from more deliberation and care.
Id. at 3. In that same proceeding, Commissioner Robert McDowell also questioned
Chairman Martin's management of the deliberative process, explaining that
[i]nterestingly, this year, in a disturbing development, the FCC's most recent Form
325 data was not made available to commissioners for review until 7:09 p.m. last
night. It was only made available once it was obvious that a majority of the
Commission would not support the initial draft of this Report because it was such a
dramatic departure based on mysterious statistical manipulation. But why was this
data omitted or suppressed to begin with? Was it because it concluded cable
penetration was only at 54 percent, just like last year?
Statement of Robert M. McDowell, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Dissenting in Part,
Re: Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery of Video
Programming, MB Docket No. 06-189, Thirteenth Annual Report (Nov. 27, 2007), at 1,
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-278454A6.pdf.
49. Kevin J. Martin, Op-Ed., The Daily Show, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2007, at A29.
50. Federal Communications Commission Oversight Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science & Transportation, I I0th Cong. 2 (2007) (testimony of Jonathan S.
Adelstein, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-278905Al.pdf. Ironically, the
regulations being considered were to replace a set of regulations that the Third Circuit
invalidated because, among other reasons, they were adopted without sufficient public
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Chairman Martin stated that the FCC adhered to its traditional practices in
this proceeding.51
In the media ownership proceeding, the Commission announced its
decision in a twelve-page press release a week before Christmas 2007.52 At
that time, Commissioners Copps and Adelstein protested both the
substance and the process used to develop the rules. In particular,
Commissioner Copps recounted that the FCC engaged in the last-minute
charade of pretending to allow input via a public hearing in Seattle (to
which 1,100 citizens came with a week's notice) and a last-minute notice
(after the outcry about the New York Times op-ed) while at the same time
rushing to complete and vote on the Order without taking the public's
concerns seriously. In a telltale sign of the rushed nature of the proceeding,
the process of revising the Order continued right up until the Commission
was set to vote on it. As Copps recounted,
Then, last night at 9:44 pm-just a little more than twelve hours before
the vote was scheduled to be held and long after the Sunshine period [when
comments, even on an "ex parte" basis, can no longer be filed] had begun-a
significantly revised version of the Order was circulated. Among other
changes, the item now granted all sorts of permanent new waivers and
provided a significantly-altered new justification for the [relevant rules]. But
the revised draft mysteriously deleted the existing discussion of the "four
factors" to be considered by the FCC in examining whether a proposed
combination was in the public interest. In its place, the new draft simply
contained the cryptic words "[Revised discussion to come]." Although my
colleagues and I were not apprised of the revisions, USA Today fared better
because it apparently got an interview that enabled it to present the
Chairman's latest thinking.
53
notice to allow careful deliberation and examination of their weaknesses. See Prometheus
Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 409-12 (3d Cir. 2004) (remanding regulations to the
FCC for further consideration because the Commission's notice that it planned to create a
"new metric" to "reformulate [its] mechanism for measuring diversity and competition in a
market," and the fact that the commission was "contemplating 'design[ing] a test that
accords different weights to different outlet types,"' did not allow public scrutiny of the
regulations which were adopted, prejudicing the appellants).
51. See Federal Communications Commission Oversight Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 109th Cong. 4 (2007) (written statement of Kevin
J. Martin, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-278904Al.pdf ("[A]lthough not
required, I took the unusual step of publishing the actual text of the one rule I thought we
should amend.").
52. Press Release, Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Media
Ownership (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.fcc.gov/kjml21807-ownership.pdf (explaining
adoption of media ownership rules).
53. Statement of Michael J. Copps, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Concur in Part,
Dissent in Part, Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting Services 2
(Dec. 18, 2007), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-07-217A3.pdf
[hereinafter Copps Statement].
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Finally, in a practice that is all too common at the FCC, the agency did
not release its opinion and final rules until almost three months after the
vote, 54 leaving affected parties to guess what the actual opinion discussed,
allowing a shadow lobbying process to attempt to influence the ultimate
opinion after the FCC announced its decision and raising questions about
the legitimacy of its action. In this context, moreover, the delay only
underscored that the earlier rushed push for a vote did not reflect any bona
fide urgency but rather was a tactical effort by the Chairman to close the
proceedings on his preferred terms.55
In all three cases described above, the Commission treated the public as
irrelevant to its institutional operation. In each case, interested parties, and
even some commissioners, were reduced to reading press reports (based on
leaks) to gain insight into the issues before the agency. Commissioner
Adelstein decried the agency's approach to regulatory policy in the cable
context, stating that "[w]e cannot cook the books to pursue a political
agenda without dismantling our very institution. We simply must act like
the expert agency Congress intended, and not squander our precious
legacy. 56  Finally, agency staff persons have criticized the politicized
manner in which the agency has operated of late, complaining, on one
account, that they were "sick of what they experience as a super-politicized
work life in which just about anything that they want to do has to get the
54. Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting Services, 23 F.C.C.R.
5922 (2008). For the newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rule, the FCC released the text
of the order around six weeks after the initial vote. See 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory
Review, 23 F.C.C.R. 2010 (2008).
55. In particular, Commissioners Copps and Adelstein noted upon the release of the
newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rule,
After being told we have to "hurry up" and vote by December 18, the
Commission waited over a month and a half before finally issuing this Order.
Apparently, it took the majority that long to finalize issues left unresolved at the time
we voted. There is no reason we could not have heeded the wishes of many in
Congress to take the time needed to work these kinks out before the Commission
voted.
Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Joint Statement by Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n
Comm'rs Michael J. Copps and Jonathan S. Adelstein on Release of Media Ownership
Order 1 (Feb. 4, 2008), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-
280001A 1.doc.
56. IP Democracy, http://www.ipdemocracy.com/archives/2007/11/28/#002781 (Nov.
28, 2007, 06:42 EST). Commissioner Copps offered similar assessments as to how the
media ownership proceeding was conducted, explaining in his dissenting opinion,
This is not the way to do rational, fact-based, and public interest-minded policy
making. It's actually a great illustration of why administrative agencies are required
to operate under the constraints of administrative process-and the problems that
occur when they ignore that duty. At the end of the day, process matters. Public
comment matters. Taking the time to do things right matters.
Copps Statement, supra note 53, at 3.
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go-ahead from the top."
5 7
C. The Possibiliy of Regulatory Reform
Shakespeare famously wrote that "what's past is prologue. 58 At the
FCC, that might well be the case. Nonetheless, scholars and policymakers
need not view it as inevitable that the agency will continue to use broken
procedures. As emphasized by the teachings of new institutional
economics, institutional strategies matter and "organizations can be
structured to optimize the benefits and costs of expert decisionmaking."
'5 9
Famously, after President Kennedy blundered in the management of the
Bay of Pigs episode, which reflected poor planning and a lack of discussion
of alternatives, he instituted a far more effective institutional process to
manage the Cuban Missile Crisis.
60
For an example of how a regulatory agency can change in terms of its
operating procedures, consider the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).
Historically, that agency's operating procedures failed to spur deliberation
and data-driven decisionmaking. Thus, after being appointed Chair of the
agency, "[Alfred] Kahn criticized what he viewed as an intellectually
bankrupt means of doing business-deciding issues in secret, without
deliberation, and asking lawyers to develop the necessary justification for a
pre-determined result., 61 Reflecting his commitment to transparency and
open debate, he systematically changed how the agency operated, starting
57. Matthew Lasar, FCC Insider: This Place Is Hell, Silent Protest Planned, ARS
TECHNICA, Mar. 16, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/03/fcc-insider-this-
place-is-hell-silent-protest-planned.ars. Reportedly, an FCC staff person related the
following:
"In the past I may or may not have agreed with the outcome, but at least the proper
procedures were followed. Now they tell us 'what are the media reform groups going
to do: file a class action lawsuit? Just do it.' But ethically I have to sleep at night.
It's not the decision, it's how the decision is reached. The situation has become
arbitrary and capricious."
Id.
58. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1.
59. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 561 (2002).
60. Id. at 561-62.
61. Philip J. Weiser, Alfred Kahn as a Case Study of a Political Entrepreneur, 7 REV.
NETWORK ECON. 603, 607 (2008),
http://www.rnejournal.com/artman2/uploads/l/weiserRNEdecO8.pdf (footnote omitted).
As Kahn described the CAB's process for generating opinions before his arrival,
[Al lawyer on the General Counsel's staff, amply supplied with blank legal tablets
and a generous selection of cliches-some, like "beyond-area benefits," "route
strengthening" or "subsidy need reduction," tried and true, others the desperate
product of a feverish imagination-would construct a work of fiction that would then
be published as the Board's opinion.
McCRAW, supra note 17, at 286.
[61:4
2009] THEFCCAND THE HIDDENSIDE OF THEADMINISTRATIVESTATE 691
with a commitment to write orders in understandable prose. Ultimately,
however, Kahn's changes at the CAB were short-lived because the agency
was dismantled in the 1980s pursuant to the Airline Deregulation Act.
At the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), strong leadership and a
commitment to sound institutional practices overcame the legacy of an
"erratic career" that left the agency vulnerable to mission creep and sailing
adrift. 62 In particular, over the last twenty-five years, the agency has come
back from the brink and currently operates in an effective manner that has
won accolades for its ability to be an effective political entrepreneur and
regulator in the Internet age.63 Two successful recent FTC Chairs, Robert
Pitofsky and Timothy Muris, both were successful political entrepreneurs
who effectively utilized strategic planning and a positive agenda to lead the
agency. Both Pitofsky and Muris focused on important opportunities, such
as confronting the Internet as an important social and economic force as
well as spearheading the enactment of the Do Not Call list regulations. The
Chairs' actions ensured, as Timothy Muris put it, that the agency was not
merely a "passive observer, swept along by external developments and
temporary exigencies. 64  The agency's ability to implement such an
agenda and reestablish its value to the nation underscored the wisdom of
giving it a chance to right itself in the midst of calls for it to be shut down
on account of its flawed institutional processes and lack of clear-eyed and
common-sense priorities.65
For a final example of how an agency can change, consider the case of
Ofcom, the United Kingdom (UK) communications industry regulator.
Prior to the establishment of Ofcom, observers complained about the
operation of one of its predecessor agencies, the Independent Television
Commission (ITC). Notably, those complaints parallel how the FCC
operates today. As one regulated entity noted,
62. McCRAw, supra note 17, at 126-27.
63. As FTC Chairman Kovacic described, the FTC was loathed by Congress in the
early 1980s, with one congressman concluding that it was "'a rogue agency gone insane.'
William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of
Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 590 (1982) (quoting Rep. William Frenzel). By
the time Kovacic wrote his article on the topic, he concluded that the agency was already
mending its ways and becoming more effective. Id. at 671 (noting its effective use of,
among other things, "planning, research, and preliminary screening"). For a more recent
positive appraisal of the agency, see Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm
Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041 (2000).
64. Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 165, 168 (2005).
65. Former FTC Commissioner Philip Elman, for example, concluded in the early
1970s that the "best thing to do would be to start all over again, abolish the [C]ommission
and set up a new agency." NORMAN I. SILBER, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: THE LIFE OF
PHILIP ELMAN 368 (2004).
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[I]n terms of getting a fair hearing and in terms of being confident that the
regulator has absolutely assessed the merits of the various competing cases,
we think Ofcom plays a pretty straight bat, and that was not always the case
in the past. At the ITC there was a tendency for a decision to come out of
nowhere and you would not have any forewarning, you would not even
know it was an issue for consultation and suddenly it was not just a
consultation, it was a decision.
66
In contrast to its legacy means of operation, Ofcom has established itself, in
a relatively short period of time (it was founded in 2003), as an "evidence-
led" regulator committed to the proposition that gathering evidence and
making data-driven decisions is "part and parcel of effective regulation.,
67
II. TOWARD A NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY
Thoughtful leadership can help to change an agency's culture and
commit to serious strategic thinking and planning. To be successful, the
agency's leadership must overcome the tendency toward making reactive
judgments at both the macro-level, in terms of what issues the agency
prioritizes, as well as on the micro-level, in how the agency conducts and
manages its particular proceedings. With respect to the FCC, it generally
does not set forth and commit to a clear agenda of what issues it will
prioritize; indeed, when it does address specific issues, it generally seeks to
preserve its discretion (to act in an ad hoc manner) by avoiding standards
that constrain its policy choices. 68 On the micro-level, the FCC tends to
use NPRMs that set forth broad and vague lines of inquiries, giving parties
very little guidance on what issues to address while preserving its
discretion to proceed in any number of directions. This practice gives a
decided advantage to "inside players," who are sophisticated at reading tea
leaves, skilled at keeping up with leaks of information, and able to follow
the ex parte process, which has long been abused at the FCC.69
Going forward, the FCC has the opportunity to set a strategic agenda and
66. Statement of Mr. Christy Swords, Director of Regulatory Affairs, ITV plc, at the
House of Lords Select Committee 11 (Apr. 24, 2007),
www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/correctedEV920070424.pdf.
67. Id. at 4.
68. The Landis Report highlights this phenomenon, reporting that
criteria of various different kinds are articulated but they are patently not the grounds
motivating decision. No firm decisional policy has evolved from these case-by-case
dispositions. Instead the anonymous opinion writers for the Commission pick from a
collection of standards those that will support whatever decision the Commission
chooses to make.
LANDIS, supra note 24, at 53.
69. Indeed, in the Landis Report's assessment of administrative agencies, it concluded
that the FCC "more than any other agency, has been susceptible to ex parte presentations."
Id.
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commit to procedures that ensure a high level of transparency. On the
strategic level, the FCC needs to establish a preset agenda and begin to
undertake overarching evaluations of broad policy such as maximizing the
use of spectrum, the impact of market structure (on prices, innovation, and,
in the media sector, the availability of local and diverse content), and the
use of advanced technology by public-safety agencies. 70 All too often, the
FCC approaches these topics in an isolated fashion-for example, in the
context of a merger review or a proceeding involving a band of spectrum-
and is forced to invent its entire approach to an issue in a hurried fashion.71
In so doing, the agency improvises on a series of dimensions at once-
whether to use a rulemaking or an adjudication to set or refine rules, how to
emphasize back-end enforcement versus front-end restrictions, and whether
to impose disclosure requirements.
The upshot of the FCC's method of decisionmaking is that it often
makes important judgments with limited data, an artificially constrained set
of alternatives, and, in many cases, a penchant for delay. As is evidenced
in a number of cases (including the ones discussed in Part I), this approach
produces suboptimal results and leaves both Commission staff and affected
parties without a clear sense of the agency's goals or direction.72 But the
impact of the FCC's process is more subtle and insidious than that.
Notably, because the agency's flawed processes undermine the ability of
investors and entrepreneurs to predict how and when the agency will act,
the FCC's institutional processes discourage new firms from developing
technologies that depend on FCC decisions (like spectrum regulation).
Thus, whereas the poor results that flow from the FCC's flawed processes
are sometimes apparent and may be corrected at some point down the road
(through, for example, judicial review), the lack of investment and
innovation that ensues from an absence of predictable, expeditious, and
70. Former Chairman Hundt and Greg Rosston suggested a similar approach, albeit one
that would also involve the Department of Justice. See Hundt & Rosston, supra note 10, at
34.
71. Former FCC Chairman Newton Minow claims that this failure is endemic to the
multimember commission structure, which drives the practice of "postpon[ing] the policy
decision to resolution on a case-by-case basis which all too often means inconsistent
decisions with the public and the regulated industry not knowing the ground rules." Minow,
supra note 1, at 147. This claim is questionable, however, insofar as other regulatory
agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the FTC, do not face
this systemic problem despite their need to operate as a collegial body.
72. Former FCC Commissioner Johnson bemoaned this state of affairs by highlighting
that if the Commission precommitted to clear goals, methodologies, and constrained its
discretion through a commitment to transparent institutional processes, "The FCC staff and
the parties that appear before the Commission would have more specific knowledge of what
is required of them in the regulatory scheme, and the regulated industries would operate
more efficiently by knowing more about what the Commission's regulatory policies were
designed to accomplish." Johnson, supra note 3, at 179.
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reasoned decisionmaking invariably remains unaddressed and constitutes a
loss to the economy and society as a whole.
A. Strategic Agenda Setting
To appreciate the overall lack of strategic agenda setting at the FCC,
compare the model of regulation used by the European Commission (EC).
The EC uses a tripartite process to gather information and engage the
public when it formulates its regulatory strategy. First, it encourages its
staff members to develop their views and perspectives in working papers,
which are released to the public. Second, the agency commissions
independent research to inform the agency's own thinking. Finally, it
engages the public, opening up what it calls a "consultation," to seek
diverse views and perspectives on the relevant issues. Based on this
process, the EC is in a position to develop its overarching regulatory
strategy for a broad policy area, such as the transition to the next generation
of Internet technology and the role for public policy therein.73 In that
context, for example, the EC has set out its specific goals and outlined a
74timetable for consideration of a number of the relevant issues.
The European Union is hardly alone in using a model of regulatory
policymaking that involves considerable up-front analysis and discussion
before setting an overarching course. Ofcom, the regulator established in
the UK in 2003, has internalized a commitment to strategic policymaking.
To that end, it embarks on a series of broad reviews, uses regular
consultancies, and issues "Annual Plans" to explain its views on the
general regulatory environment and what issues will be addressed going
forward.75 In a case closer to home, consider how the FTC has used a
systematic effort to increase its knowledge base on emerging issues such as
73. For the European Commission's press release, see Press Release, Europa,
Commission Consults on How to Put Europe into the Lead of the Transition to Web 3.0
(Sept. 29, 2008),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1422&format=HTML&age
d=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=nl. For the background working paper, see Comm'n of
the European Cmtys., Early Challenges Regarding the "Internet of Things" (Working
Document, 2008),
http://ec.europa.eu/information-society/policy/rfid/documents/earlychallengesIOT.pdf.
74. COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., COMMUNICATION ON FUTURE NETWORKS AND
THE INTERNET 10-11 (2008),
http://ec.europa.eu/information-society/eeurope/i2010/docs/future internet/act futurenetw
orksintemet en.pdf.
75. See, e.g., OFCOM: OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, A CASE STUDY ON PUBLIC SECTOR
MERGERS AND REGULATORY STRUCTURES (2006),
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/accoun/case-study/case-study.pdf (addressing, among other
matters, the politics and legislation, public engagement, and governance issues surrounding
Ofcom's development and future public-sector mergers).
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behavioral advertising.76 In that context, the agency first identified the
issue as part of its set of hearings on "Protecting Consumers in the Next
Tech-Ade," where it invited a large number of stakeholders to offer their
perspectives. 7 Resulting from that investigation, the FTC hosted a town
hall discussing behavioral advertising.78  Finally, after an effort by FTC
staff to identify a set of principles and issues for resolution, the agency
released a document entitled "Online Behavioral Advertising: Moving the
Discussion Forward to Possible Self-Regulatory Principles," inviting
further comments from stakeholders. 79 By contrast, the FCC generally
collapses all three of these steps into a single process that all too often
begins with a broad and vague notice and ends with a blizzard of ex parte
filings and rules adopted in haste without sufficient deliberation, public
input, or transparency.
It merits noting that the model of strategic agenda setting urged here is
not completely foreign to the FCC. Such an approach, however, has yet to
take hold as part of the agency's culture. Consider, for example, the
extremely thoughtful framework developed by Chairman Kennard in his
vision of "A New Federal Communications Commission for the 21st
Century." 80 In his vision document, Chairman Kennard highlighted the
importance of identifying high-level strategic priorities and specific
measures that the agency aims to implement. Notably, he focused on the
value of moving away from classic technology-based distinctions, urging
the Commission to focus instead on "universal service, consumer
protection and information; enforcement and promotion of pro-competition
goals domestically and internationally; and spectrum management."8 '
Kennard's list presciently identified that the traditional divide between
local and long-distance communications would disappear and broadband
communications would eclipse narrowband. Unfortunately, while
Kennard's vision document identified very important, forward-looking
questions-such as "whether and how the government should be involved,
76. As former Chairman Muris explains, this approach follows similar efforts by
Pitofsky and himself to engage in relevant policy research and development. See Muris,
supra note 64, at 176-79 (detailing the FTC's efforts to increase their knowledge base,
including holding multi-day workshops and fact-finding hearings).
77. Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumers in the Next Tech-Ade,
http://www.ftc.gov/techade (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
78. Federal Trade Commission, 2007 FTC Workshop: Ehavioral Advertising,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/ehavioral/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
79. See generally FED. TRADE COMM'N, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: MOVING
THE DISCUSSION FORWARD TO POSSIBLE SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES (2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/12/P859900stmt.pdf.
80. WILLIAM E. KENNARD, A NEW FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE
21 ST CENTURY (1999), http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/fcc2 l.pdf.
81. Id. at 1.
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if at all, in applying these principles," such as the historic commitment to
open architecture and interconnection in "a world where competition will
largely replace regulation" 82 -it failed to provide any framework to
generate answers for these questions or a timeline for the relevant questions
to be addressed.
When Chairman Powell replaced Chairman Kennard, he declined to
embrace and follow through on the vision set forth in A New Federal
Communications Commission for the 21st Century. In particular, he did
not seek to fundamentally restructure the operations of the agency along
functional lines, 83 as Kennard had begun to do by consolidating the
agency's enforcement and public information functions in a stand-alone
bureau.84 Although Powell did not take any transformational steps to align
the agency's operations along functional lines, he did take the important
step of recognizing the impact of technological convergence by merging
the separate Mass Media and Cable Bureaus.8 Moreover, he appreciated,
in principle at least, the importance of setting broad areas of focus and
identified six of them-(1) broadband, (2) competition, (3) spectrum, (4)
media, (5) public safety and homeland security, and (6) the modernization
of the FCC.86 He did not, however, offer any "meta" strategy for how the
agency would approach these policy domains.
In the important area of spectrum reform, Chairman Powell developed a
strategic and broad agenda through a process similar to the EC's process.
In particular, he commissioned the creation of an interdisciplinary task
force that drew upon a number of talented public servants at the FCC to
think through and broadly reevaluate the goals of spectrum policy. The
Spectrum Policy Task Force report that emerged from that process
highlighted a number of important issues for the agency to evaluate and
sought to set a proactive agenda for the agency. Moreover, the Task
Force's work and its effort to identify relevant proceedings in a
comprehensive and coherent manner markedly distinguished the treatment
of that area from other priorities of the agency.8 To underscore the point,
82. Id. at 4.
83. Id. at 15.
84. Id. at 10-12.
85. Cf id. at 4 (discussing the convergence of various technologies and the need for the
FCC to respond through its regulations).
86. See generally id. at 6-9 (discussing goals and proposed changes at the FCC).
87. See SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, REPORT (2002),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A I .pdf.
88. Compare, for example, the information related to the relevant goals of the agency
with respect to spectrum and other issues. Compare Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Strategic
Goals for Proceedings and Initiatives, http://wireless.fcc.gov/spectrum/proceeding.htm (last
visited July 25, 2009), with Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Strategic Goals for Competition,
http://www.fcc.gov/competition (last visited July 25, 2009), and Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n,
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the only other one of the six priorities noted above where the agency
displayed a hint of broad strategic thinking was public safety and homeland
security. As to that issue, the agency adopted a two-page action plan to
govern its efforts in 2003.89
Under Chairman Martin, the broad goals identified by Chairman Powell
were kept in place, but the broad project of spectrum reform as identified
by the Task Force report was essentially abandoned without any effort to
set alternative strategic priorities. 90 In so doing, the agency left spectrum
policy issues to once again be addressed on an ad hoc basis, i.e., without
the benefit of any overarching commitment to resolve particular issues, a
more developed empirical and theoretical framework for regulatory policy,
or any commitment to communicating to the public the agency's
perspective on those issues. 91  Reflecting the frustration that
telecommunications issues are not guided by any overarching agenda and
thus appear on (and disappear from) the agency's agenda without apparent
reason or warning, some commentators have complained that the FCC is
"the worst communicator in Washington.'
92
Strategic Goals for Broadband, http://www.fcc.gov/broadband/ (last visited July 25, 2009),
and Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Strategic Goals for Media, http://www.fcc.gov/mediagoals/
(last visited July 25, 2009).
89. See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, FCC HOMELAND SECURITY ACTION PLAN (2003),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-236428A2.pdf (announcing dual
objectives to promote homeland security including strengthening protection of the
communications infrastructure and promoting effective communication during
emergencies).
90. See Establishment of an Interference Temperature Metric to Quantify and Manage
Interference and to Expand Available Unlicensed Operation in Certain Fixed, Mobile and
Satellite Frequency Bands, 22 F.C.C.R. 8938, 8938 (2007); id. at 8940 (Copps, Comm'r,
concurring).
91. To be sure, strategic planning should not involve a mechanistic or formalistic
commitment to addressing particular issues at predetermined times, but it should provide for
a self-conscious commitment to publicly identified priorities. As the Chairman of the U.K.
Competition Commission explained, strategic planning "'cannot be too rigid and it cannot
be too binding. [B]ut everything we do should take place . . .against a background of
priorities and policy consciousness."' WILLIAM E. KoVACIC, CHAIRMAN, FED. TRADE
COMM'N, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT 100: INTO OUR 2ND CENTURY, at xii (2009),
www.ftc.gov/os/2009/0 1/ftc I 00rpt.pdf (footnote omitted).
92. IP Democracy,
http://www.ipdemocracy.com/archives/002640the fcc-is-the-worstcommunicator-in-was
hington.php (Sept. 5, 2007, 9:17 EST); see also John Dunbar, FCC Shrouds Rulemaking in
Secrecy, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 5, 2007, at 3A ("It's odd for an agency
that has the word 'communications' as its middle name, but the Federal Communications
Commission routinely leaves the public in the dark about how it makes critical policy
decisions."); Capital Ideas, http://www.multichannel.com/blog/CapitalIdeas/7925-
FederalIncommunicadoComnission.php (Aug. 8, 2007) (discussing the evasive attitude
used by the FCC commissioners when dealing with members of the press).
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B. A Commitment to Transparency
The FCC's lack of transparency operates on a number of levels. First,
when the agency announces a rulemaking, it rarely suggests specific rules
and sometimes does not even ask specific questions for parties to address.
Second, the FCC's notice-and-comment processes are often a meaningless
precursor to the "real" discussion that occurs during the so-called ex parte
process, where parties file short statements that, at least often in practice,
do not set out the full extent of oral discussions. This unofficial
opportunity for comment, which is not regulated by any legal framework
and generally is available only to those well connected to the agency, was
judged by FCC Chairman Powell in 2005 as "out of control. '93 Finally,
when the FCC announces its adoption of an order, it often does so without
releasing the actual text, raising questions as to what the agency actually
voted on and what happens between the so-called vote and the final
issuance of the order-which can take place many months later. This
section discusses how and why the FCC needs to reform each of these
shortcomings.
In terms of managing its rulemakings, the FCC has gotten into the habit
of commencing wide-open proceedings that do not propose specific rules.
Consequently, the FCC generally leaves parties with the challenge of either
guessing what issues are really important or reserving their energies and
resources until the ex parte process when that might become clear.
Technically speaking, this practice does not violate the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), which specifies only that NPRMs must include "a
description of the subjects and issues involved. 94 Practically speaking,
however, this practice undermines the opportunity for meaningful
participation and effective deliberation.
To appreciate the real-world impact of the FCC's practice, consider the
case of a recent initiative to impose requirements on local radio stations to
compile playlists and community outreach efforts.95 The basic idea behind
the proceeding-to develop more information related to how radio stations
operate-was a noble one (discussed in Part III below), but the way it was
conducted deprived the public and affected parties of key information that
93. Video: Digital Broadband Migration Conference: Rewriting the Telecom Act
(University of Colorado Law School 2005), http://itp.colorado.edu/itp-content/sftp-
conference-videos (scroll to "The Digital Broadband Migration: Rewriting the Telecom
Act," then follow "Part 6" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
94. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2006). The D.C. Circuit has specified that the relevant
concern is that "if the final rule deviates too sharply from the proposal, affected parties will
be deprived of notice and an opportunity to respond to the proposal." Small Refiner Lead
Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
95. See generally Broadcast Localism, 23 F.C.C.R. 1324 (2008).
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could have informed their participation and feedback. In that case, radio
lobbyists were left scrambling to find out relevant details about the specific
proposal, such as who would have to submit such reports and how often.9 6
Unfortunately, the situation was hardly unique, with "[c]ommunications
lawyers and lobbyists privately complain[ing] they have difficulty figuring
out the status of their issues at the FCC." 97 This state of affairs raises the
obvious question that, in an environment where even some well-connected
lobbyists cannot discern such information, how can ordinary consumers
hope to offer meaningful input?
To remedy the FCC's use of vague and generalized NPRMs, the agency
should commit to publishing model rules (or at least specific suggestions)
on any topic it envisions addressing to set the stage for public comment. If
the agency engages in the strategic planning effort suggested above,
disclosing more relevant details at the outset of proceedings should flow
naturally. Notably, releasing the proposed rules up front is the common
practice for many other agencies; 98 for the FCC, however, it constitutes the
exception. This places the FCC far outside the norm of most agencies,
which release notices that "routinely contain the full text of the rule as well
as lengthy preambles, including the information, data, and analyses upon
which the agency relied." 99
If the FCC persists in opening proceedings with only a general
description of the relevant issues, it has two options for providing sufficient
notice and enabling effective deliberation. First, it could begin with a
Notice of Inquiry, which is designed to elevate the agency's understanding
of an issue and not to generate binding rules. Alternatively, if it does use a
NPRM with a limited disclosure of the issues that ultimately emerge as
important, it should issue a Further NPRM, as the agency recently did in
the so-called D Block proceeding, which was designed to facilitate the
emergence of a private-public partnership for public-safety
communications. 00
As for the ex parte process, the agency's commitment to greater
transparency as to what issues are up for discussion at the commencement
96. Amy Schatz, Industry Seethes as FCC's Martin Sets New Curbs, WALL ST. J., Dec.
18, 2007, at Al.
97. Puzzanghera, supra note 12.
98. At the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), for
example, notices of proposed rulemakings often are both shorter in terms of the relevant
background and focus commentators specifically on suggested rules. See, e.g., E-9 11 Grant
Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 57,567 (Oct. 3, 2008) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 400).
99. Jennifer Nou, Note, Regulating the Rulemakers: A Proposal for Deliberative Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 601, 610 (2008).
100. See Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, 23 F.C.C.R.
14,301, 14,452 (2008).
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of a rulemaking will limit the need and opportunity for a heavy reliance on
ex parte communications. In any event, the agency needs to take seriously
the value of a reasonable level of disclosure when ex parte meetings take
place. Indeed, in some cases, the general disclosures in the filings that
accompany such meetings verge on the comedic. Take, for example, a
filing by Alltel that stated merely that company officials met with a few
FCC staff persons "to share our thoughts" on a particular proceeding.10'
This sort of filing has repercussions for the parties themselves insofar as
their desire to keep their presentations secret is at odds with the legal
requirement to make "a record" of their objections in order to pursue them
on appeal. Unfortunately, the FCC's culture of secrecy around what items
are up for discussion at particular points in time has contributed to an
environment that, as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) put it,
enables "stakeholders with advance information about which rules are
scheduled for a vote [to know] when it may be most effective to present
their arguments to FCC, while stakeholders without access to this
information may not.'
0 2
The current system of ex parte filings that are devoid of content not only
undermines informed deliberation of the relevant issues but also precludes
the opportunity for meaningful judicial review.103 To be sure, the penalty
placed on parties deprived of judicial review provides some incentive not to
engage in the prevailing practice, but the culture of secrecy retains a
powerful hold on those engaged in the ex parte process. Consequently, the
appropriate remedy is a fundamental reform of how the agency operates,
including not merely ending the use of vague NPRMs but also requiring
agency officials, as opposed to lobbyists, to be responsible for filing the
document that captures the relevant discussions, as many other agencies
require.1
0 4
101. Letter from Laura Carter, Vice President for Fed. Gov't Affairs, Alltel Corp., to
Marlene Dortch, Sec'y, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n (Apr. 30, 2008),
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf=pdf&iddocument=652000685
4.
102. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FCC SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE EQUAL
ACCESS TO RULEMAKING INFORMATION 4 (2007),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071046.pdf. In response to the Government Accountability
Office's stinging report-which criticized the FCC's ex parte process on the ground that
well-connected lobbyists can gain crucial information and insights about its processes not
available to others-the FCC committed to post on its website all items that are circulating
for a decision.
103. In a costly example of this phenomenon at work, Sprint was prevented from
challenging certain FCC rules that might require it to vacate valuable spectrum because the
company had failed to make its arguments in ex parte filings with sufficient specificity to be
preserved for appellate review. See Sprint Nextel Corp. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 253, 256-57
(D.C. Cir. 2008).
104. Another obvious option-for the agency to police abuses in the ex parte process
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The abuse of the ex parte process is exacerbated by two features of FCC
proceedings that are under the agency's control: the length of its
proceedings and the lack of a well-developed and evidence-based record.
First, if the FCC could manage its proceedings with an eye to how issues
are developed and commit, as a general strategy, to open a Further NPRM
after a certain interval, it would elevate the importance of "official"
filings-as opposed to placing the real weight on ex parte filings. One
option, suggested by a few commentators, is to institute a "shot clock" that
would require agency action within a prescribed period of time.10 5 Rather
than impose a procedure that would artificially rush resolution of difficult
issues, however, the agency should institute the norm that it will conduct
proceedings in a timely manner and embarrass itself when it does not-
prominently listing on its website the pending proceedings, how long they
have remained unresolved, and the status of the record.10 6 Second, if the
FCC would, as discussed below, use administrative law judges (ALJs) to
conduct proceedings and develop an evidentiary record through open
testimony under oath, it could radically change the agency's culture. In
particular, once an AU published proposed findings of fact for evaluation
by the Commission, the discussion would center on a relevant set of issues
grounded in empirical data, ending the guesswork that drives much of the
ex parte process for those who are not well-connected lobbyists. Third, as
discussed below, the FCC could commission and publish independent
research to inform its deliberations and highlight the relevant issues for
discussion.
Finally, as to the FCC's procedure for adopting rules, the agency needs
to commit to issuing its written opinions on the day the decision is
announced. At present, many high-profile matters are decided when the
actual written opinion has yet to be finalized. As for what the agency does
during this time, one commentator suggested that the opinions that are
actually voted on do not reflect "well-reasoned statements of principle" but
rather are a "patchwork of pieces" that must be stitched together after the
itself-is one that the FCC has shown itself unwilling or incapable of pursuing. See
Spectrum Talk, http://spectrumtalk.blogspot.com/2008/09/marcus-spectrum-solutions-
files.html (Sept. 11, 2008, 11:57 EST) (presenting a filing with the FCC that took issue with
the agency's consistent inability to enforce its ex parte rules over the past few years).
105. Ted Hearn, The Winds of Change, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 26, 2008,
http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6525874.html. For a skeptical assessment of such
suggestions, see Alden F. Abbott, The Case Against Federal Statutory and Judicial
Deadlines: A Cost-Benefit Appraisal, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 171 (1987).
106. To appreciate the need and cause for such embarrassment, consider that it is not
unheard of for the FCC to leave proceedings languishing for longer than a decade. See
Hearn, supra note 105 (noting pendency of petition to deny must-carry rights to TV stations
that primarily air home-shopping programming).
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decision is announced, often requiring substantive redrafting. °7
III. TOWARD PRINCIPLED AND COLLEGIAL DECISIONMAKING
A critical challenge facing the FCC is how to more carefully evaluate
how and when to use notice-and-comment rulemaking, adjudication, and
merger-review proceedings as strategies for making policy decisions. In all
three contexts, the agency often takes procedural shortcuts that avoid
engaging in true data development and evaluation. To highlight the
failings in each context and the need for a more well-thought-out strategy
of how they should each be used, this Article discusses one example of
each and presents a number of different possible reforms.
A. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
The theory of notice-and-comment rulemaking is that an agency can use
this process to develop its policy judgments. The weakness of this process
is that it does not provide the agency with an effective avenue for
developing an empirical basis for and understanding of the issues involved
in a regulatory policy domain. As Judge Posner explained in observing the
agency's handling of the finsyn rules, "The nature of the record compiled
in a notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding-voluminous, largely
self-serving commentary uncabined by any principles of reliability, let
alone by the rules of evidence-further enlarges the Commission's
discretion and further diminishes the capacity of the reviewing court to
question the Commission's judgment."' 0 8 Indeed, the appeal of using a
procedure that can lead to cooking the books, as Commissioner Adelstein
noted as to one rulemaking,10 9 leads the FCC to rely almost exclusively on
the paper record of the notice-and-comment rulemaking process and the
use of the opaque ex parte process as a means of focusing in on its
conclusions.
To appreciate the value of a process focused on data-driven analysis,
consider the FCC's recent development of a location mandate for E-911
calls made from wireless phones. At a high level of generality, there was a
consensus that facilitating better access to this information for public safety
answering points (PSAPs) was an important public policy goal. In
107. Harry M. Shooshan III, A Modest Proposal for Restructuring the Federal
Communications Commission, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 637, 648 (1998).
108. Schurz Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 1992) (citation
omitted).
109. Commissioner McDowell apparently seconded that judgment in a private e-mail to
his staff. See DECEPTION AND DISTRUST, supra note 6, at 14 (quoting McDowell as stating,
"The books have been cooked to trigger the 70/70 rule.").
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conducting the proceeding, however, the FCC used some of the same
tactics noted above, seeking to impose greater specificity as to the location
accuracy that wireless providers must share with PSAPs" 0 after a rushed
comment period process and on the basis of an ex parte proposal that was
subject to no public comment and no agency deliberation.
In dissenting from the E-911 location Order, Commissioner Adelstein
noted that "while I support providing first responders with the best data
possible, today's item is fraught with highly dubious legal and policy
maneuvering that bypasses a still developing record on what should be the
reasonable and appropriate implementation details.""' In particular,
Commissioner Adelstein added that
[g]iven the huge commitment of resources and effort needed to make the vast
progress we have yet to make, a collaborative, cooperative approach is the
most effective way to achieve the goals all of us share. Adopting in whole
cloth an eleventh hour proposal at the stroke of Sunshine's end is not the way
to promote an atmosphere for progress. Instead of working with all
stakeholders, the Commission today simply adopts on a Tuesday a proposal
filed on Friday. Offering no opportunity for deliberation or participation by
so many stakeholders does not befit an expert agency.l2
In highlighting the FCC's questionable conduct, Adelstein noted that the
agency should not have rushed to a decision on a paper record but rather
should have taken advantage of workshops and collaborative forums to
reach a solution that all parties, at least in principle, were committed to
reaching.1 3 Ultimately, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau
acknowledged that the Order was overly aggressive and imposed a stay,' 
14
prompting Commissioner Adelstein to highlight that the earlier decision to
"plow[] forward with [mandating] compliance benchmarks without a full
record, rather than conducting this proceeding in a more thoughtful and
deliberate manner, [did] not truly advance E911."1
5
Rulemaking proceedings conducted on a paper record can serve a useful
function. They are not, however, the right tool for all regulatory policy
challenges. Moreover, they need to be used in a more strategic context-
relying on developed knowledge and allowing for informed deliberation-
to be successful public policymaking tools. Notably, rulemakings need not
110. See Wireless E911 Location Accuracy Requirements, 22 F.C.C.R. 20,105, 20,108
(2007).
111. Id. at 20,136 (Adelstein, Comm'r, approving in part, dissenting in part).
112. Id. at 20,137.
113. See Wireless E911 Location Accuracy Requirements, 22 F.C.C.R. 10,609, 10,636-
37 (2007) (Adelstein, Comm'r, concurring).
114. Wireless E911 Location Accuracy Requirements, 23 F.C.C.R. 4011,4012 (2008).
115. Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein
Responds to Public Safety Bureau Stay Order (Mar. 12, 2008),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-280787A 1 .pdf.
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be viewed as a binary alternative to the use of adjudication, but can actually
follow from and be informed by adjudication. Finally, rulemakings must
be managed with appropriate oversight-neither rushing issues to a
premature judgment nor allowing them to linger without any resolution."
16
B. Adjudications, Enforcement, and the Use ofALJs
The FCC so seldom uses adjudicative processes that some observers
overlook the fact that the agency is authorized to use them at all. Indeed,
when the agency conducts an adjudication, the process looks nothing like
traditional adjudicatory processes. After all, the FCC often fails to provide
opportunity for discovery, the submission of evidence under oath, the open
selection of witnesses, or cross-examination. Consider, for example, the
recent Comcast case involving that company's network management
processes." 7 In that case, the FCC styled the proceeding as an adjudication
even though it did not use any judicial-like process, i.e., the actual
proceeding mirrored the agency's rulemaking processes noted above.
Indeed, that proceeding once again evoked the all-too-familiar complaints
by dissenting commissioners that they were forced to vote on an order
without the benefit of sufficient time to evaluate its substance."
8
The FCC's management of the Comcast case in a fashion more akin to a
rulemaking should not surprise observers of the agency. After all, the FCC
only employs two ALJs and they rarely handle adjudicative proceedings.
Indeed, when an ALJ is given an assignment-as occurred recently with a
case involving a dispute between the NFL Network and Comcast-the
FCC often maintains a high level of involvement and micromanagement of
the proceeding, thereby undermining the AL's authority." 9 As for the
Enforcement Bureau, its processes are often managed with a level of
political oversight and a lack of commitment to neutral determination of
116. For a comprehensive assessment of the rulemaking process at administrative
agencies (with a focus on the FAA), see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AVIATION
RULEMAKING: FURTHER REFORM Is NEEDED TO ADDRESS LONG-STANDING PROBLEMS (2001),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO1821 .pdf.
117. See generally Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028
(2008).
118. Id. at 13,088 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting) ("Commissioner Tate and I received
the current version of the order at 7 p.m. last night, with about half of its content added or
modified. As a result, even after my office reviewed this new draft into the wee hours of the
morning, I can only render a partial analysis.").
119. In that proceeding, the FCC backed off its effort to dictate matters after Chairman
Martin left the agency, reassigning the proceeding to the administrative law judge (ALJ) and
authorizing it to go forward. See John Eggerton, Cablers Win Respite on Network Access
Claims, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 27, 2009, http://www.multichannel.com/article/162848-
CablersWinRespite.On NetworkAccessClaims.php?rssid=20059.
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complaints. Consequently, it is not empowered to act effectively on
complaints and has failed, according to a GAO report, to resolve many of
them or explain why no action was taken.
120
Going forward, the FCC has an important opportunity to invigorate its
enforcement program and use it in a more strategic matter. In particular,
the FCC needs to develop the capability to enforce its rules in a credible
manner so that it can, in appropriate instances, shift from its legacy focus
on restricting what parties can do before the fact to evaluating the impact of
actual behavior after the fact. In the case of spectrum policy, for example,
the FCC's legacy orientation means that spectrum licensees are restricted in
how they can use their spectrum so that they avoid even the theoretically
possible creation of interference-as opposed to making a showing that
they created interference in practice.12 1 To be sure, the FCC has
experimented with the model of allowing greater front-end flexibility in
return for after-the-fact oversight,122 but this approach is the exception.
To appreciate the limited development of the FCC's enforcement
processes, consider the long-standing complaints that satellite-radio
providers were violating the terms of their licenses. In particular, as
Commissioner Tate put it, Sirius Satellite Radio "failed to comply-
knowingly and repeatedly-with the specifications for its FM modulators
and the terms of its Special Temporary Authorizations... for more than
five years. 123 In the face of this problem, one might suspect the FCC had
conducted a vigorous enforcement proceeding. That belief, however,
would be mistaken. In fact, the FCC only took action and entered into a
consent decree with the two companies once they were on the brink of
receiving approval to merge with one another. Consequently, as a
condition of receiving approval to merge, Sirius agreed to a "voluntary
contribution" of $2,200,000 and XM agreed to one of $17,394,375.124
The FCC's failure to treat seriously the long-standing complaints about
120. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FCC HAS MADE SOME PROGRESS IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF ITS ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM BUT FACES LIMITATIONS, AND ADDITIONAL
ACTIONS ARE NEEDED 5 (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08125.pdf.
121. For a discussion of this issue, see Philip J. Weiser & Dale Hatfield, Spectrum
Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of Property Rights, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 549, 558-
68 (2008); Weiser, supra note 21, at 26-28.
122. See Amendment of Part 15 Regarding New Requirements and Measurement
Guidelines for Access Broadband over Power Line Systems (BPL Order), 19 F.C.C.R.
21,265 (2004) (adopting new regulations to promote the "rapid introduction and
development" of broadband systems).
123. Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., 23 F.C.C.R. 12,301, 12,324 (2008) (statement of
Comm'r Tate).
124. Id. (describing the consent decree the FCC entered into with Sirius); XM Radio,
Inc., 23 F.C.C.R. 12,325, 12,347 (2008) (statement of Comm'r Tate) (describing the consent
decree the FCC entered into with XM).
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Sirius and XM's behavior is emblematic of the agency's lack of
commitment to effective enforcement. In failing to enforce its rules
effectively and reliably, the FCC both undermines a commitment to rule-
of-law values and sometimes ends up making accommodations to parties
who violated rules that were not previously enforced.12 5 Ideally, the FCC
would, in such cases, authorize the Enforcement Bureau to bring cases
before ALJs to develop the necessary factual record to either make the
entry of consent decrees a meaningful law enforcement act (as opposed to a
political negotiation)12 6 or lead to an adjudicated decision. In practice,
however, the FCC almost never uses its ALJs and, according to the FCC
website, FCC ALJs have decided only three matters since 2005.127
The promise of using ALJs is readily apparent when one evaluates how
state agencies manage telecommunications policymaking. In many cases,
state public utility commissions are able to use ALJs to hear evidence and
create a well-developed factual basis for the agency's deliberations.
28
Indeed, in some states, the "ALJs are more independent than state appellate
or trial court judges."'129  In using ALJs, state commissions (and some
federal ones, like the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) separate the
trial staff so that they do not interact with the staff persons who advise the
commission in its role as adjudicator.
In conceiving of the appropriate role for ALJs, it is important to
appreciate that they need not be used to decide matters of regulatory policy
per se. Rather, they can merely be asked to determine the relevant facts,
which is their comparative advantage. Take, for example, the Comcast
decision, where the FCC attempted, using a paper record, to evaluate what
types of network management techniques Comcast used. In so doing, the
FCC relied on the self-serving and unexamined statements presented in that
process and reached a judgment vulnerable to the criticism offered by
125. See, e.g., Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, 23 F.C.C.R. 16,807,
16,808 (2008) (adopting new rules legalizing the unlicensed use of TV spectrum locations
that are unused by licensed services); see also Posting of Harold Feld to Wetmachine,
http://www.wetmachine.com/totsf/item/1256 (July 16, 2008, 18:53 EST) (complaining that
the FCC should not "reward" users of illegal wireless microphones by offering them priority
over authorized users).
126. The practice of treating enforcement actions as a political negotiation is discussed
and criticized in the House Commerce Committee majority report. See DECEPTION AND
DISTRUST, supra note 6, at 18-19, 23-24.
127. See Fed. Commc'ns Cornm'n, Office of Administrative Law Judges,
http://www.fcc.gov/oalj/ (last visited July 19, 2009).
128. Robert C. Atkinson, Telecom Regulation for the 21st Century: Avoiding Gridlock,
Adapting to Change, 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 379, 396 (2006) (noting that state
regulatory commissions, unlike the FCC, use ALJs regularly and arguing that the FCC
should begin using them effectively).
29. Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and
Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 551, 571 (2001).
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Commissioner McDowell: "The truth is, the FCC does not know what
Comcast did or did not do."'130 The FCC could instead have referred the
matter to an ALJ to render a set of proposed factual findings pursuant to
established procedures that would have enabled the agency to better
understand the relevant facts and make a more informed policy judgment.
In contemplating a role for ALJs, it is important to recognize that this
model can be implemented in more- or less-effective ways. At the FTC,
for example, the use of administrative adjudication can undermine that
agency's effective and expeditious resolution of disputes when personnel
rules prevent the agency from using ALJs with relevant expertise in
antitrust or consumer behavior. 31  To address this issue, the agency has
recently proposed new rules to expedite the process, has experimented with
using commissioners to sit as ALJs (although that raises questions about
prejudging issues), and has asked Congress to allow it to select ALJs with
relevant experience.' 3 2 Nonetheless, even assuming that the FTC improves
its administrative-litigation process, some have leveled the more
fundamental criticism of this model of decisionmaking that it often leads to
the preordained results sought by the FTC. 133 This cautionary concern, to
the extent it counsels against administrative litigation in the FTC context, is
far less applicable in the FCC context where cooking the books is already
an endemic concern as to its rulemaking processes. Consequently, the
effective use of ALJs by the FCC promises to improve the quality of its
policymaking process because it would provide the agency with a more
rigorous factual understanding of the relevant issues than can be obtained
by sorting through a paper record to identify the salient facts.
130. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,092
(2008) (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting). As Commissioner McDowell explained,
The evidence in the record is thin and conflicting. All we have to rely on are the
apparently unsigned declarations of three individuals representing the complainant's
view, some press reports, and the conflicting declaration of a Comcast employee.
The rest of the record consists purely of differing opinions and conjecture.
Id. (footnote omitted).
131. For a discussion of FTC's use of administrative litigation, see KOVACIC, supra note
91, at 42-45.
132. See Prepared Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm'n Before the House Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., and Transp. 15-16 (Apr. 8, 2008),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimonyP034101reauth.pdf.
133. See A. Douglas Melamed, The Wisdom of Using the "Unfair Method of
Competition " Prong of Section 5, GCP, Nov. 2008, at 12-24,
http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/704e2922-6df7-4bb7-bd88-014695e523bl /Pre
sentation/PublicationAttachment/f5c9a3c8-3a90-4b 1 6-900b-2a54a5ba420a/MelamedNov_
08 l.pdf (arguing that agency members cannot be neutral and independent adjudicators
because they unavoidably act to advance the interests of the agency and providing statistical
evidence showing that the FTC consistently rules against respondents).
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C. Merger Reviews
The third principal type of policymaking vehicle used by the FCC is
merger-review proceedings. Technically speaking, these proceedings are
adjudications, but practically speaking, they are often negotiations where
the FCC seeks to leverage its authority to approve the merger to obtain
concessions that often have little or nothing to do with the competitive
issues raised by the transaction. 34 In his criticism of this process, former
Chairman Powell noted that it "places harms on one side of a scale and
then collects and places any hodgepodge of conditions-no matter how ill-
suited to remedying the identified infirmities---on the other side of the
scale.' 35 Thus, unlike the Justice Department, the FCC does not make any
effort to ensure that there is "a significant nexus between the proposed
transaction, the nature of the competitive harm, and the proposed remedial
provisions.' ' 136  But because the very nature of the proceeding involves
"voluntary" concessions, this type of action is outside the scope of judicial
review.
In conducting its merger reviews, the FCC often engages in a form of the
rushed judgments that it makes at the end of a rulemaking proceeding.
Consider, for example, the review of the merger between AOL and Time
Warner in 200 1.13 In that case, the FCC evaluated whether it should
impose an interoperability mandate on AOL's instant messaging service.
The agency not only failed to analyze the connection of the remedy to the
merger, but it cursorily concluded that it had the authority to regulate in an
area outside its traditional mandate. Notably, the FCC concluded that
instant messaging and "AOL's [names and presence database] are subject
to our jurisdiction under Title I of the Communications Act."' 38 As then-
Commissioner Powell pointed out in dissent, it was questionable for the
FCC to reach such a judgment in haste, as "such a grand conclusion should
only be reached after very careful and thoughtful deliberations and full
134. One commentator has referred to this tactic as "administrative arm-twisting." Lars
Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of
Authority, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 873, 876.
135. Applications of Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC Commc'ns Inc., Transferee
for Consent to Transfer Control of Corporations Holding Commission Licensees and Lines
Pursuant to Sections 214 and 310(d) of the Communications Act and Parts 5, 22, 24, 25, 63,
90, 95, and 101 of the Commission's Rules (Ameritech Order), 14 F.C.C.R. 14,712, 15,197
(1999) (Powell, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO
MERGER REMEDIES 2 (2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf.
137. See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section
214 Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL
Time Warner Inc., Transferee, 16 F.C.C.R. 6,547 (2001).
138. Id.at6,610.
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comment by a wide range of interested parties."' 139 As to the merits of the
FCC's action, there were serious questions at the time that its decision was
flawed on competition policy grounds. 140  The passage of two years
revealed as much and the FCC decided to remove the condition. '
4'
A second flaw in the FCC's use of its merger authority is that the
willingness of applicants to negotiate "voluntary conditions" facilitates the
agency's tendency to make decisions in an ad hoc manner. Despite the fact
that such conditions only apply to the merging parties, the FCC sometimes
uses such proceedings to decide issues that are otherwise pending in
industry rulemakings-leading to one set of rules for those who have
merged and another set of rules for similarly situated parties who have not.
Consider, for example, the issue of whether local telephone companies
should be required to provide "naked DSL" (i.e., DSL service without
providing a telephone line). Rather than address the issue in an industry-
wide rulemaking, the FCC used the pendency of two merger proceedings
involving the largest telephone companies (AT&T and Verizon) to impose
such a requirement on them alone. 42  Similarly, with respect to network
neutrality, the FCC had originally suggested that its Internet policy
statement was nonbinding; 43 nonetheless, when SBC and Verizon
proposed to merge with AT&T and MCI, respectively, the FCC imposed a
condition that the companies agree to abide by those principles. 44  In
urging that the agency not operate in this fashion, then-Commissioner
Abernathy highlighted that "the customary administrative weaponry in the
Commission's arsenal-rulemaking, enforcement, and so on-does not
suddenly evaporate once a merger is approved."' 
45
The final flaw that is often inherent in the FCC's merger-review process
139. Id. at 6,713 (Powell, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. See Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation,
28 N. KY. L. REV. 822, 842 (2001) (critically evaluating the FCC's decision in the AOL-
Time Warner merger case).
141. See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section
214 Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL
Time Warner Inc., Transferee, 18 F.C.C.R. 16,835 (2003).
142. See SBC Commc'ns Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer
of Control (AT&T Order), 20 F.C.C.R. 18,290, 18,392 (2005); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. and
MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control (Verizon Order), 20 F.C.C.R.
18,433, 18,537 (2005).
143. See Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Chairman Kevin J. Martin Comments
on Commission Policy Statement (Aug. 5, 2005),
http:/Ihraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-260435A2.pdf ("While policy
statements do not establish rules nor are they enforceable documents, today's statement does
reflect core beliefs that each member of this Commission holds regarding how broadband
internet access should function.").
144. See A T&T Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 18,350-51; Verizon Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 18,509.
145. Verizon Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 18,573 (Abemathy, Comm'r, statement).
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is the agency's practice of accepting a variety of "voluntary conditions"
that it later declines to enforce. Consider, for example, the FCC's decision
to condition the merger between SBC and Ameritech on, among other
things, SBC's commitment to entering into thirty markets outside of its
region.14 6 The sheer ambition of enforcing such a commitment begs so
many questions-what constitutes "real entry," is a transitory entry
sufficient, etc.-that it did not surprise seasoned observers of the agency
that there was little or no follow-through on enforcing the commitment.
Nonetheless, the agency continues to impose a variety of conditions that
are far from self-executing and are outside its normal regulatory mandates,
doing so most recently in the merger of XM and Sirius, where the agency
imposed a series of conditions ranging from an "a la carte" mandate to a
requirement to provide noncommercial channels. 147 Despite the request of
some parties that the agency adopt a specific enforcement mechanism to
ensure that such requirements are followed, 148 the FCC declined to do so,
suggesting that, once again, the past may well be prologue in terms of
enforcing merger conditions.
Contrary to the claims of some critics, the FCC's merger-review
processes are not hopelessly dysfunctional and irremediable. To be sure,
this view is plausible and pressed by former Commissioner Harold
Furchtgott-Roth, among others. 14 9 This position, however, overlooks that
there are successful cases of FCC merger review and that the agency's
oversight of mergers can be a productive part of the policymaking
process. 50 Consider, for example, the FCC's review of the News Corp.-
146. Ameritech Order, 14 F.C.C.R 14,712, 14,877 (1999).
147. See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses XM Satellite
Radio Holdings Inc., to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, 23 F.C.C.R. 12,348, 12,359
(2008) (listing the FCC's requirements in permitting the merger).
148. See Letter from Gigi B. Sohn, President, Public Knowledge, and Andrew J.
Schwartzman, President & CEO, Media Access Project, to Kevin Martin, Chairman, Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n (July 10, 2008), http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native-or pdf=pdf&iddocument-6520033905 (arguing that the lengthy petition process
and waiting for licenses to come up for renewal are not sufficient enforcement mechanisms
and that the FCC should have an independent oversight position to enforce merger terms);
Letter from Paul P. Desai and Andrew J. Schwartzman, Media Access Project, to Marlene
Dortch, Sec'y, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n (July 9, 2007), http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/
prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native.or pdf-pdf&id document=6519541586 (arguing that, if
approved at all, the proposed merger between Sirius and XM should be conditioned on the
following requirements: (1) "A set aside for non-commercial, educational programming,"
(2) "Leased access of channels," (3) "[A] portion of the allocated spectrum returned for
auction," and (4) "[C]arry[ing] local non-commercial, educational channels").
149. Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth, Testimony Before the Antitrust Modernization
Comm'n 5-7 (Dec. 5, 2005), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/
commissionhearings/pdf/FurchtgottRothstatement.pdf.
150. For a discussion of merger remedies and the appropriate role of regulatory
authorities in them, see generally Philip J. Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual
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DIRECTV merger. In that case, the agency stuck to devising competition
policy remedies that were necessitated by the merger. 151 Notably, the
Justice Department concluded in that case that the FCC's action
"addresse[d] the Department's most significant concerns with the proposed
transaction" and the FCC's action justified its decision to close its
investigation. 152 In imposing a set of conditions as part of clearing the
merger, the FCC did not adopt a stand-alone regime that it would be
unlikely to enforce but rather imposed a set of requirements that were
harmonized with its existing regulatory requirements. 153 Finally, as for the
rules imposed as part of the merger that had no counterpart in the FCC's
regulatory requirements, the agency developed a special procedure of the
kind it declined to adopt in the XM-Sirius matter, i.e., it instituted an
arbitration regime with appeal to the Commission.1
54
IV. TOWARD DATA-DRIVEN DECISIONMAKING
The FCC has yet to develop a model of generating information and
insights that can inform its policymaking agenda. This part outlines how
the agency could seek to obtain better information, elicit more-effective
public input, and, finally, enable the public to play a more constructive role
in the agency's work. First, it highlights the importance of commissioning
and publishing research that underlies its conclusions. Second, it calls for a
more effective partnership with other resources that can provide valuable
analysis and insight. Third, it makes the case for a more self-conscious
strategy for developing sources of data. Finally, it explains that there are a
number of strategies the agency could use to involve the public in its
decisionmaking.
A. A Commitment to Independent Research
The FCC rarely commissions, supports, or uses truly independent
research in its policymaking activities. Over the last several years, this
tendency has eroded both the intellectual credibility and legal validity of
the agency's rules. To address this failing, the FCC must commit to
seeking out relevant sources of data and engaging in data-driven analysis as
Regulation: Reforming Dual Merger Review by the DOJ and the FCC, 61 FED. COMM. L. J.
167 (2008).
151. See Gen. Motors Corp. & Hughes Elec. Corp. (News Corp. Order), 19 F.C.C.R.
473, 552-55 (2004).
152. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Will Not Challenge News
Corp.'s Acquisition of Hughes Electronics Corp. (Dec. 19, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/December/03_at714.htm.
153. See News Corp. Order, 19 F.C.C.R. at 531-34.
154. Id. at 553-55.
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well as ending its habit of relying on single points of data that, in many
cases, it avoids sharing for analysis and criticism. In so doing, the FCC
should reestablish the tradition of an empowered Chief Economist and
Chief Technologist, both of whom should play essential parts in an Office
of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis (OSPPA) that develops
published working papers to inspire constructive discussions and farsighted
analysis. In recent years, both positions have been filled only sporadically
and very few OSPPA working papers have been published. Worse yet,
employees often were afraid that those who "express an opinion, even if
based on fact" might well be "demoted, reassigned, or hounded out of the
agency" if the opinions articulated differed from a preset agenda. 
155
To begin on a positive note, it merits appreciation that two of the FCC's
signature achievements over the last forty years emerged from independent
research commissioned from outside of the agency. First, consider the
Computer I decision, 156 where the FCC sought to protect competition in the
data processing industry and keep it free of regulation. To develop its rules
in that case, the FCC contracted with the Stanford Research Institute to
analyze the comments and develop a proposal for the agency's regulatory
strategy. Similarly, in the case of the Part 68 rules, 157 which facilitated
competition in the equipment market and ended the almost decade-long
effort by AT&T to avoid the letter and spirit of the Carterphone
decision, 158 the FCC contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to
define the relevant interface to the public switched telephone network for
terminal equipment. In both cases, the FCC's regulations were upheld by
the courts and were a huge success in practice.
The Computer I decision is a remarkable FCC decision and an important
guide to policymakers for a number of reasons. First, the agency examined
an issue in a proactive fashion and sought independent analysis to guide its
judgment. Second, the decision reflected a commitment to considering the
interests of the innovator who was not before the Commission in the
particular proceeding. 159  Finally, the FCC engaged in ongoing
155. DECEPTION AND DISTRUST, supra note 6, at 21.
156. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communication Services and Facilities (Computer 1), 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971).
157. 47 C.F.R. §§ 68.1, 68.2 (2008).
158. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420
(1968).
159. The same praise is owed to the FCC's extension of the Part 15 rules to authorize
the use of spread spectrum, ultimately leading to the development of Wi-Fi technology. See
generally Thomas W. Hazlett, A Rejoinder to Weiser and Hatfield on Spectrum Rights, 15
GEO. MASON L. REv. 1031, 1038 (2008) (noting that deregulation of the use of unlicensed
bands for radio transmitters paved the way for the use of spread spectrum devices, including
Wi-Fi routers and cordless phones).
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reassessment of the effects of the decision, ultimately revising it as the
agency evaluated the relevant economic issues and technological
changes. 160
Over the last several years, the FCC has encountered increasing judicial
hostility and criticism for its management of research related to its
decisions. Consider, for example, the FCC's Access Broadband over
Power Line (BPL) decision.' 6' That ruling sought to move to an after-the-
fact model of spectrum management, thereby evaluating interference
between different users in practice rather than in theory. This effort to
generate more real world data emerged from a flawed FCC decisionmaking
process whereby the agency failed to make public the initial spectrum
measurements that informed its judgment that this change in regulatory
strategy was appropriate. Consequently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit reversed the FCC's decision, underscoring that the
Administrative Procedure Act requires that agencies make public "the
technical studies and data upon which the agency relies" to establish
binding regulations. 162 In so doing, the D.C. Circuit revealed some of its
impatience with the FCC's operating practices, noting that "[i]t would
appear to be a fairly obvious proposition that studies upon which an agency
relies in promulgating a rule must be made available during the rulemaking
in order to afford interested persons meaningful notice and an opportunity
for comment"' 63 and that "the Commission can point to no authority
allowing it to rely on the [unpublished] studies in a rulemaking but hide
from the public parts of the studies that may contain contrary evidence,
inconvenient qualifications, or relevant explanations of the methodology
employed."' 64
The last two media ownership proceedings revealed a similar missed
opportunity to generate, evaluate, and utilize thoughtful research. In the
2003 effort to evaluate the optimal regulatory strategy for restricting media
ownership, the FCC sought to develop a "Diversity Index" to structure its
regulation of the broadcast industry. 165 When the agency adopted its rules,
it failed to provide parties with a sufficient opportunity to scrutinize and
160. See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 129-33 (2003) (highlighting the various actions taken in the
Computer Inquiries and describing the changes made in the subsequent Computer II and
Computer III decisions).
161. BPL Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 21,265, 21,300 (2004).
162. Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
163. Id. at 237.
164. Id. at 239.
165. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,887-901 (2003).
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provide feedback about the scope and nature of the Diversity Index.
Consequently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the
FCC in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 166 highlighting that
[a]s the Diversity Index's numerous flaws make apparent, the Commission's
decision to withhold it from public scrutiny was not without prejudice. As
the Commission reconsiders its Cross-Media Limits on remand, it is
advisable that any new "metric" for measuring diversity and competition in a
market be made subject to public notice and comment before it is
incorporated into a final rule.
167
The FCC's latest media ownership rulemaking (discussed above) did not
heed this counsel and essentially repeated the mistake made in its earlier
proceeding. In particular, the agency not only failed to rest its decision on
more supportable grounds, it actually ignored the research that the agency
itself was developing. As Mark Cooper described the most recent
proceeding,
In its haste, the new research agenda devoted little attention to defining and
operationalizing the goals of the Communications Act. This tunnel vision
ignored efforts by the FCC to understand its policy goals in the period after
the court remanded its new media ownership rules. The new agenda led to
results-driven research projects. Simply put, the Commission started from
the result it wanted and worked backwards. 
168
In light of the judicial responses to failed FCC processes in the BPL and
media-ownership cases discussed above, some might argue that the
necessary incentives for institutional reform are present and, in any event,
the Judiciary is capable of compensating for the FCC's institutional
failings. This view, however, overstates greatly the impact of judicial
review. Notably, many rulemakings vulnerable to the concerns highlighted
above-such as an overreliance on the ex parte process--do not necessarily
raise a ground for reversal. 169 More fundamentally, many of the
institutional failings discussed above often lead to agency inaction that,
even when subject to correction through the extraordinary remedy of a writ
of mandamus, can only be addressed many years--even a decade-after
166. 373 F.3d 372, 435 (3d Cir. 2004) (remanding so that the FCC may justify or
modify its method for setting numerical limits).
167. Id. at 412.
168. Mark Cooper, Junk Science and Administrative Abuse in the Effort of the FCC to
Eliminate Limits on Media Concentration 5-6 (May 21, 2008) (unpublished paper,
presented at the 2008 annual meeting of the International Communication Association),
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p-mla-aparesearch_citation/2/3/3/1 /l/pages23311 8/p2
33118-1.php.
169. Consider, for example, that the D.C. Circuit has concluded that reliance on ex parte
contacts is "impolitic" but not grounds for reversal. See Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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the fact. 170 Consequently, the impetus for institutional reform will need to
come either from the agency itself or Congress.
B. An Effective Partnership with Other Governmental, Academic, and
Industry Resources
Over the last several years, the FCC has generally sought to go it alone.
Considering that it regulates an industry in which technological change is
exploding and in which a wide variety of stakeholders can provide the
agency with valuable insights and information, this strategy is misguided.
In the years ahead, the agency should seek to engage an array of entities
that can enable it to operate more effectively.
First, the agency should reengage other governmental agencies,
nonprofit organizations, and academic institutions. With respect to other
governmental agencies, there are a number of notable agencies with
scientific and technical capabilities with whom the FCC could and should
seek more frequent cooperation, including the Commerce Department
laboratories and the standard-setting expertise at National Institute of
Standards and Technology. On the state and local front, the FCC's
abandonment of the State and Local Government Advisory Committee and
its lack of relationship with state chief information officers both greatly
hamper its effectiveness in areas ranging from broadband policy to public-
safety communications. As for nonprofit and academic organizations, the
agency can enlist them as partners in elevating the level of analysis of
critical communications policy issues by reaching out to them, taking their
research more seriously, and seeking to generate data that can enable
independent research.
In terms of the private sector, the FCC has a number of opportunities to
enlist valuable expertise. For starters, the agency should once again
activate the Technical Advisory Committee that, when active, was a
valuable sounding board on both broad strategic issues and specific tactical
ones. As Russell J. Lefevre, president of IEEE-USA, put it, "Despite the
generally excellent nature of its internal staff, given all of the technical
issues within the FCC's jurisdiction, it may be prudent to seek means to
supplement the internal technical capabilities of the Commission. 172
170. See, e.g., In re Core Commc'ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 861-62 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(granting a writ of mandamus and ordering the FCC to respond to a 2002 remand by 2008).
171. For a broad discussion about how such bodies are and can best be used, see BRUCE
L.R. SMITH, THE ADVISERS: SCIENTISTS IN THE POLICY PROCESS (1992).
172. Letter from Russell J. Lefevre, President, IEEE-USA, to Kevin J. Martin,
Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n (June 5, 2008),
http://www.ieeeusa.org/policy/policy/2008/060508.pdf
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C. Collecting and Sharing Data with the Public
To facilitate data-driven decisionmaking, the FCC must develop a more
coherent and comprehensive commitment to collecting relevant data. The
agency currently lacks, for example, the most basic data about how the
wireless spectrum is being used and where broadband services are
available. Moreover, the agency has failed to make available the
information it does have in an easily accessible form that can invite outside
parties to analyze it and remix it in interesting ways. This failing is not just
a missed opportunity. Rather, it fundamentally undermines the agency's
ability to execute on its mission. With respect to the prices businesses paid
for high-capacity lines (so-called special access pricing), for example, the
GAO excoriated the FCC's lack of data that, as it put it, is necessary to
determine whether the agency's "deregulatory policies are achieving their
goals.' 73  In short, the FCC has not developed an effective strategy for
either collecting data or distributing it. 174
On the broadband front, there are huge opportunities for the FCC's data-
collection efforts to play an important role in public policy development.
To date, the FCC has abdicated that responsibility, setting up a
measurement regime in 1998 (which defined broadband as "200 kilobits"
and measured availability by whether anyone in a zip code had broadband
service) and leaving that system unchanged for a decade. 175 In the absence
of FCC leadership on this front, different states took up the mantle of
broadband policy, emphasizing the importance of broadband measurement
and mapping and proceeding without the benefit of federal guidance or
support. 176  Just recently, Congress unanimously passed the Broadband
173. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FCC NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS ABILITY TO MONITOR
AND DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF COMPETITION IN DEDICATED ACCESS SERVICES 15 (2006),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0780.pdf.
174. See generally Philip M. Napoli & Joe Karaganis, Toward a Federal Data Agenda
for Communications Policymaking, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 53 (2007) (outlining the
problems associated with communications policymaking due to the deficiencies in
availability and accessibility of data sources); David Robinson et al., Government Data and
the Invisible Hand, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 160 (2009) (proposing that the government
redesign the means in which it provides information to the public by creating a publicly
accessible infrastructure).
175. In 2008, the FCC finally revised its decade-long measurement procedure, but that
revised model will not go into effect until 2009. See Development of Nationwide
Broadband Data to Evaluate Reasonable and Timely Deployment of Advanced Services to
All Americans, Improvement of Wireless Broadband Subscribership Data, and
Development of Data on Interconnected Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP)
Subscribership, 23 F.C.C.R. 9691 (2008), reconsidered, 23 F.C.C.R. 9800 (2008).
176. See PHILIP J. WEISER, A FRAMEWORK FOR A NATIONAL BROADBAND POLICY 14-15
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Data Improvement Act, requiring the FCC to take such a leadership role in
this area.
1 77
In addition to evaluating the extent of broadband deployment, the FCC
could also help to more clearly define the level of broadband service and
educate consumers in broadband markets as to what they should expect
from their provider. 78 Today, for example, no effective disclosure regime
exists to make clear what "up to 1 megabit per second" really means.
1 79
With a better understood disclosure regime in place, providers would be
pressured to compete more vigorously along quality dimensions (as
opposed to merely price). Indeed, competition for lower calorie, lower
sodium, or lower fat foods only emerged once an understandable disclosure
regime for nutritional information was developed and implemented. 180
The FCC's decision to end the collection of some quality measures in
telephone markets suggests a lack of appreciation for the point that,
especially in competitive markets, sunlight on the services offered by
providers is even more important. In making this decision, the FCC
concluded that the absence of similar obligations on other carriers rendered
the legacy regime suspect.18' In short, this Order moved the FCC in the
wrong direction. The right question is how can the agency develop a
systematic portrait of the marketplace so that its data-collection efforts are
accurate, can inform consumers, and can enable data-driven policymaking
in a sound and prudent manner. 1
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177. Martin H. Bosworth, Congress Passes Broadband Data Improvement Act,
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Oct. 2, 2008,
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2008/1 0/congress.broadband.html.
178. For a discussion as to how such an effort could operate, see Phillip J. Weiser, The
Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 273 (2008).
179. See id. at 291-92.
180. As Ellen Goodman related,
[Ilt seems natural that food manufacturers with a relatively good nutritional story to
tell would disclose nutritional information. Kraft and Nabisco could then compete on
nutritional value or Kraft could use nutritional information to distinguish its premiufi
brands like Progresso. So one might think, and yet the market did not produce
widespread disclosure of nutritional information until federal regulation required it.
It was the regulation that created a market for nutritional information that now
appears to be strong.
Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REv. 83, 139
(2006) (footnote omitted); see also Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of
Transparency: What Makes Disclosure Policies Effective? 16-17 (Dec. 2004),
http ://www.hks.harvard.edu/taubmancenter/transparency/downloads/effectiveness.pdf
(noting competition based on nutritional information after government regulation set forth
framework for disclosure).
181. Service Quality, Customer Satisfaction, Infrastructure and Operating Data
Gathering, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,647 (2008).
182. The lack of effective information collection by the FCC "create[s] 'information
vacuums that hamper just the kinds of analyses that have become an increasingly prominent
part of contemporary media policymaking[,]' thereby undermining the agency's ability to
ADMINISTRA TIVE LA W REVIEW
On the wireless spectrum front, it is widely appreciated that spectrum is
both a valuable and underused resource. One challenge in facilitating the
development of a robust secondary market is that many would-be lessors of
spectrum licenses do not know whom to contact. Thus, an initial challenge
for the FCC is to establish a user-friendly spectrum registry that identifies
the different bands of spectrum, a contact person, and stated terms for
leasing access to spectrum.183 By posting this information, the FCC would
enable entrepreneurs, policymakers, and ordinary citizens to evaluate both
potential policy reforms and new business strategies.
In developing new databases of information, it is not sufficient merely to
make them available to the public-the FCC also should enable citizens to
manipulate information and use it in creative ways. 184  At present,
unfortunately, the FCC databases are not only difficult to search, but they
do not give citizens the opportunity to use that data and make connections
between different data sets-say, broadband deployment and job creation.
Consequently, the agency has failed to spur what one commentator calls
"wikinomics," i.e., enabling user-generated content. 185 This trend is just
now taking root, as groups of ordinary citizens are combining information
related to a variety of topics, ranging from crime rates in Chicago
neighborhoods and Los Angeles communities at risk of fire violations to
using technologies like Google Maps to make interesting connections.
18 6
Over the last several years, the FCC has often viewed the job of
engaging the public as a chore, not a responsibility and opportunity.
Significantly, the public should not merely be viewed as interested and
informed consumers-say, individuals interested in the best opportunities
to purchase broadband connections-but also engaged citizens. Improving
engage in data-driven decisionmaking. Philip M. Napoli, Paradoxes of Media Policy
Analysis: Implications for Public Interest Media Regulation 4-5 (2008) (McGannon Center
Working Paper), http://fordham.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context-mcgannonworking-papers.
183. To its credit, the FCC has recognized that such a registry would help facilitate effective
spectrum trading but has not developed one. In particular, the FCC has concluded that intensive
spectrum leasing within the existing administrative regime "would require tradeoffs in
multiple dimensions-e.g., time, space, geography, type of use, and technology-and that,
in the absence of an effective facilitator, search costs would be high." Promoting Efficient
Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets, 18
F.C.C.R. 20,604,20,692 (2003).
184. See Robinson, supra note 174, at 160-61 (arguing that private actors are better
suited to provide information to citizens and should be allowed to create and alter the ways
individuals have access to public data).
185. See generally DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: How MASS
COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING (2006) (highlighting various examples of mass and
global internet collaboration).
186. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Op-Ed., From Wikinomics to Government 2.0, WALL ST.
J., May 12, 2008, at A13 (describing the growth of user-generated content as it expands to
various public citizen-driven endeavors).
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the transparency of how the agency operates, upgrading its website to make
it more usable, and involving the public in data collection on matters
ranging from spectrum use to broadband deployment are all important
steps. But such steps must also be followed up with efforts to engage the
public.
In soliciting public engagement, the FCC should seek ways of getting
feedback that is most conducive to shaping regulatory policy. Consider, for
example, the difference between a short e-mail expressing an opposition to
media consolidation as opposed to a more developed reaction to a specific
proposal. To be sure, a large number of e-mails expressing a basic level of
opposition to a particular course of action provides a very valuable signal.
To help justify its action, however, the agency must develop well-reasoned
arguments, which can be aided by well-informed civic participation that
comes from the deliberation on issues akin to that produced by the jury
system. 187
V. TOWARD A NEW PROJECT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The failings of the FCC are not unique among administrative agencies.
Administrative law scholars, however, have rarely evaluated the nuts and
bolts of how administrative agencies themselves operate, preferring to
address the substantive legal questions they address or the legal issues
involved in reviewing agency decisionmaking. Thus, for every one
hundred articles addressing one aspect or another of the Chevron doctrine,
there is perhaps one article-if that many-evaluating how administrative
agencies or a particular agency operates in practice.
The challenge for administrative law scholars is thus to reinvent the field
and set new priorities as to what type of scholarship can best promote
effective administrative decisionmaking. As discussed in this Article, there
is an entire aspect of the administrative state-how administrative agencies
operate in practice-that remains relatively unexplored. Going forward,
scholars can profitably engage in the important project of investigating this
question, comparing the strategies and practices of different agencies (both
domestic and foreign ones) and developing a better understanding of both
how agencies can and should operate.
187. See Nou, supra note 99, at 617-24; id. at 621-22 ("[C]itizen deliberation is
particularly important when valuing goods that are politically salient or that resonate with
social meaning, lest the decision be-or be perceived to be-left to unelected technocrats.").
For suggestions on how to enable more effective deliberation using new technologies, see
Peter M. Shane, Deliberative America, 1 J. PUBLIC DELIBERATION Article 10 (2005)
(reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004) and ETHAN J.
LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT (2004)).
ADMINISTRATIVE LA WRE VIEW
The FCC provides an illuminating case study, but a number of other
agencies are also ripe for examination. The Securities and Exchange
Commission, for example, appears to have made policy decisions premised
on the promise of effective monitoring that never took place.' 88 In one
view, this can be viewed as simply a bad policy decision. Another
perspective, however, is to evaluate why the promised monitoring did not
take place, whether monitoring behavior after the fact is something the
agency is able to perform in other contexts, and, if not, what reforms might
enable the agency to perform such monitoring. Stated differently,
administrative and regulatory law scholarship generally takes the
institutional processes used by agencies as a given and evaluates whether
the substantive policy decisions or administrative procedures are within
that constraint. As explained in this Article, an agency's institutional
process is not a black box; rather, it is shaped by a series of practices that
can be examined, evaluated, and potentially changed.
Moving from institutional practices to institutional structure, the future
of administrative law scholarship will need to take seriously questions
about whether and when the right strategy is to abolish an agency rather
than to reform it. In the case of the FCC, Lawrence Lessig's call for
abolition is premised on the theory that "[y]ou can't fix DNA." 189 That
theory, however, is not necessarily the case. As demonstrated by the shock
to the FTC's system in the 1980s, agencies can radically transform their
institutional practices and performance. Moreover, any analysis of whether
to abolish an agency must also grapple with the concomitant challenge of
building a new institutional culture-a challenge that Lessig plainly
ignores.
Finally, addressing questions of institutional mission and culture must
also grapple with the sometimes awkward juxtapositions of responsibilities
lodged in administrative agencies. The framers of the New Deal
Constitution-those legislators who embraced the notion that agencies
could act effectively as a quasi-executive, quasi-legislative, and quasi-
judicial body-acted on questionable assumptions about how
administrative agencies would operate in practice. In particular, they failed
to appreciate that the ability to use these different tools sometimes leaves
agencies at a loss of how to proceed and without a fully developed sense of
188. See Stephen Labaton, Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at Al (explaining how the SEC's supervisory program, led by the
former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, was deemed a "low priority").
189. See Lessig, supra note 7. This view, which depicts agency culture as fixed, follows
a long-standing and credible depiction of how agencies operate. For an earlier such portrait,
see Feller, supra note 4, at 654 ("Existing agencies have congenital characteristics which the
most heroic efforts cannot change.").
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how any of the tools should work, and leads to a lack of focus and follow-
through in using a particular tool. As former FCC Chairman Newton
Minow put it with respect to the FCC's failings in this regard, the agency's
institutional processes often left it in "a never-never land" that produced
only "quasi-solutions."' 90 Consequently, a major project for administrative
law-albeit one that must be pursued by Congress and the agencies
themselves-is when and how agencies should use a particular
policymaking tool (e.g., rulemaking, adjudication, or self-regulation).1 91
CONCLUSION
The current policymaking tools and apparatus used at the FCC are
broken. Rebuilding the agency's culture will require not only the right
leaders for a new era, but a systematic reexamination of the agency's
institutional processes with an eye toward building a new culture. In this
respect, the reshaping of how the agency operates will be equally
challenging and important to the substantive issues that the agency will
address in the years ahead. To do so, the FCC will need to follow the lead
of the FTC, which impressively reexamined and rebuilt its institutional
culture over the last twenty-five years, thereby enabling it to operate much
more effectively and to win over its critics.
For administrative law scholars, examining the institutional processes of
the FCC as well as other regulatory agencies that suffer similar defects
represents a new brand of scholarship and raises a series of questions that
are, in effect, the hidden side of the modem administrative state. As
discussed in this Article, the design and functioning of regulatory agencies
is not one that can be assumed away or viewed as a black box. Rather,
such agencies face a series of choices about institutional processes that,
while influenced by their structure and culture, can be changed. Thus,
those processes-as well as the culture and structure of the agencies
themselves-must be critically examined and debated by the academy and
policymakers just like the substantive decisions that result from those
processes.
190. Minow, supra note 1, at 146.
191. To be sure, Professor Magill has noted the importance of this largely unexamined
issue. In so doing, however, she has taken the approach of traditional administrative law
scholarship, viewing it from the perspective of the courts who review administrative
regulation. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1383, 1415 (2004) (noting that judicial review of this choice is effectively nonexistent,
as courts tolerate the decision to proceed by a particular strategy "for a good reason, a bad
reason, or no detectable reason").
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